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BANKING  AND  THE  SOCIAL  CONTRACT
Mehrsa Baradaran*
INTRODUCTION
“[Government] support cannot go on forever, which underlines why the Social
Contract for banks must be redrawn.”1
- Paul Tucker, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England
Paul Tucker made a prescient comment while perhaps unintentionally
coining the perfect terminology to describe the current problem in banking:
the social contract between the government and banks is out of balance, due
primarily to the increased size and power of a number of banks.  This Article
will, for the first time, describe the social contract in banking and explain
how it has gone awry.  The recent financial crisis provides a compelling illus-
tration of my argument.  In 2008, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson sold the
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) to Congress and the public as an
undertaking that would help relieve Americans’ mortgage debts through
modifications and other direct relief.  Congress passed the Act, and Henry
Paulson immediately took advantage of the broad discretion given to him
under TARP to inject billions of dollars directly into the country’s largest
banks by purchasing preferred shares.2  Paulson reasoned that this was neces-
© 2014 Mehrsa Baradaran.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
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1 Paul Tucker, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Eng., Speech at the British Bankers’
Association’s Annual International Conference: Regimes for Handling Bank Failures:
Redrawing the Banking Social Contract 1 (June 30, 2009), available at http://www.
bankofengland.co.uk/archive/Documents/historicpubs/speeches/2009/speech396.pdf.
2 NEIL BAROFSKY, BAILOUT 25 (2012).
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sary to allow these banks to start lending again.  However, the deal struck
with the banks provided no requirements or incentives to actually increase
lending.3  Once the banks had money in hand, it became apparent that they
had no intention of using the funds to facilitate credit.4
In response to the voiced outrage of several Congressmen and public
figures over the diversion of funds from the public to the banks, the Treasury
Department proposed and Congress approved another program in March
2009.  The Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), a $50 million
TARP carve-out, would go directly to homeowners and fulfill the original pur-
pose of TARP by restructuring mortgages to make them more affordable and
decrease the number of foreclosures.5  Incredibly, these funds also ended up
going directly to banks.  In fact, HAMP’s faulty design caused many problems
for mortgage borrowers across the country.  When Treasury Secretary
Timothy Geithner was asked about HAMP’s failures to help mortgage bor-
rowers, his response was one of most telling exchanges of the financial crisis:
“We estimate that [the banks] can handle ten million foreclosures, over
time . . . . This program will help foam the runway for them.”6  When asked
about the one program that was specifically targeted to help the American
public, the Treasury Secretary responded that it would make banks more
profitable.7  This revelatory comment is at the heart of the misunderstanding
that has pervaded American banking policy for the past 30 years.
The misunderstanding concerns the nature of the relationship between
banks and the state.  One consequence of the confusion is the Treasury’s
assumption that the government’s paramount objective is assuring bank prof-
itability.  To be sure, regulators should work to secure a profitable and suc-
cessful banking industry, but bank profitability is a means to an end and not
an end itself.  The proper end is ensuring that the nation’s banks do what the
public needs them to do and not the other way around.
The public needs a safe and reliable banking system, without which the
economy cannot reach optimal performance.  Banks also need government
support, without which their customers would lack sufficient trust to permit
them to function properly.  Thus, banks and the government are engaged in
a partnership or agreement.  The basic agreement consists of a government
promise that it will protect banks from runs, liquidity shortages, and investor
irrationality, and a promise made by banks that they will operate safely, play
their essential role in financing the expansion of the economy, and serve the
3 Id. at 27.
4 See Mike McIntire, Bailout Is a No-Strings Windfall to Bankers, if Not to Borrowers, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 18, 2009, at A1 (noting that “many banks that [had] received bailout money”
were reluctant to issue new loans).
5 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Relief for Responsible Homeowners: Trea-
sury Announces Requirements for the Making Home Affordable Program (March 4,
2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/20093414
5912322.aspx.
6 BAROFSKY, supra note 2, at 156 (describing a meeting Barofsky attended where Eliza-
beth Warren was grilling Timothy Geitner about HAMP).
7 Id.
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needs of their customers and local communities.  This arrangement has been
effective for much of U.S. history and is still intact with regard to most U.S.
banks, but it has fallen apart with the largest and most powerful banks, those
that have been called “Too Big To Fail.”8  These banks make up less than one
percent of the banks in the country, but control the majority of the country’s
banking assets and wield a disproportionate amount of political power.9
It is these banks that were most involved in unsafe practices and these
banks to which the various bailout measures were directed.  These large
banks are the banks in which the U.S. government is most invested, and yet
these are the ones least invested in the public welfare of the country.  This is
why the social contract must be re-asserted.  Populist movements from the
right and the left, such as the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street, have demon-
strated, although sometimes vaguely, the people’s unease with the current
state of the social contract.10  President Obama has gone so far as to tell Wall
Street firms that he is standing “between [them] and the pitchforks.”11
The recent crisis made clear that bailouts were economic and political
necessities and will likely always remain necessities so long as large and sys-
temically dominant firms exist.  Therefore, the government will also continue
to stand “between [the banks] and the pitchforks.”  Both sides need to recog-
nize this inevitable relationship.  At the same time, the government must
reassert and clarify the essential nature of this relationship and demand the
reciprocity on which this social contract is premised.  In particular, the gov-
ernment must make clear that in exchange for this necessary and continued
support, the government will require certain banks to fulfill obligations for
the benefit of society.
There is a long and rich philosophical discussion about the social con-
tract between individuals and society.  In general, social contract theory
posits that individuals consent to surrender some natural liberty in exchange
for protection or other benefit conferred by society.12  This Article does not
intend to wade into social contract theory as applied by Hobbes, Kant, Rous-
seau, Rawls, and others to the individual and society.13  However, the rela-
8 Richard W. Fisher, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of Dall., Ending “Too Big to Fail”:
A Proposal for Reform Before It’s Too Late, Remarks Before the Committee for the
Republic (Jan. 16, 2013), available at http://www.dallasfed.org/news/speeches/fisher/
2013/fs130116.cfm (defining and explaining the problem of banks that are “too big to
fail”).
9 Id.
10 See Ed Pilkington, Occupy Wall Street: Tea Party Leaders Admit Similarities—But Not Too
Many, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 7, 2011, 10:53 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/
oct/07/occupy-wall-street-tea-party-comparison (explaining that one of the few similarities
between the two activist movements is the frustration with the treatment of big banks).
11 Lindsey Ellerson, Obama to Bankers: I’m Standing “Between You and the Pitchforks,” ABC
NEWS (Apr. 3, 2009, 6:17 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2009/04/obama-to-
banker/ (internal quotation marks omitted).
12 See J.W. GOUGH, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 140 (2d ed. 1957).
13 Hobbes’s explanation of the social contract begins with the “state of nature,”
wherein every individual has complete freedom and acts purely in his own self-interest.
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tionship between the government and banks resembles a social contract
because it involves the sacrifice of certain liberties that individuals make for
the protection of the state.  Here, banks gain specified protections from the
government in exchange for operating within the limits of the law, much like
the average citizen must do in order for the state to function properly.
Acknowledging the social contract does not necessarily require more regula-
tion, especially not of the most complex and costly kinds.  It requires instead
a new way of viewing the relationship between banks and the state that fully
recognizes the obligations on both sides.
This Article asserts that there are three major tenets of the social con-
tract: (1) safety and soundness, (2) consumer protection, and (3) access to
credit.  Regulators can and should require banks to meet standards in these
areas to benefit society even if these measures reasonably reduce bank prof-
its.  Implicit in the social contract is the idea that each party must give up
something in the exchange.  This Article provides policymakers not only the
appropriate narrative and justifications needed to frame their regulatory phi-
losophy, but it also provides important textual support from the most promi-
nent acts of banking legislation to give regulators the authority and charge to
ensure that banks fulfill the public’s needs.
In Part I, this Article provides a historical background of the social con-
tract and demonstrates that the social contract between banks and the gov-
ernment has existed since the inception of banking in this country and has
changed several times to meet changing circumstances and needs.  In Part II,
the Article describes the various governmental measures that protect banks
and essentially serve as a safety net and why this government support justifies
imposing public obligations on banks.  Part III defines the critical elements
of any social contract going forward, such as safety and soundness, consumer
protection, and access to credit.  Part IV demonstrates how regulators can
build on existing language and tests in banking legislation to recognize and
enforce banking’s social contract.
Because this state of nature is intolerable, individuals agree with each other to surrender
complete liberty in exchange for a society ruled by a sovereign authority. THOMAS HOBBES,
LEVIATHAN 192 (Penguin Books 1986) (1691).  Locke’s state of nature includes a natural
law, which contains a right of property.  Individuals agree with each other to give up their
right to enforce this natural law to the society.  The society establishes a legislative author-
ity whose role is to enforce the natural law for the benefit of the people.  Rousseau
regarded the social contract as an agreement among individuals to surrender their natural
liberty.  Ernest Barker, Introduction to SOCIAL CONTRACT, at xix, xxviii (Oxford Univ. Press
1962) (1947).  This surrender, however, is not in exchange for a society ruled by a sover-
eign, but rather is a submission to the “general will.” JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL
CONTRACT 55 (Christopher Betts trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1994) (1762).  Rawls adapted
social contract theory into a theory of justice.  Unlike those before him, Rawls begins with a
hypothetical situation in which individuals contract from behind a “veil of ignorance.”  The
result is a set of principles of justice for the basic structure of society. JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE 136 (1971).
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I. HISTORY OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
To reveal that a social contract exists, this Article briefly outlines the
changing nature of the bank/government relationship throughout various
phases of U.S. history.  This Part considers banking history in three phases:
(1) the colonial and Civil War era “nation-building” phase, (2) the Great
Depression and the “New Deal in Banking” phase, and (3) the “deregulatory
phase” from the 1970s through the early 2000s.  To be sure, banking
changed significantly within each phase, but the general contours of the
social contract remained roughly the same.
A. The Colonial to Civil War Social Contract
Banking started in America to aid the colonies in building an economy
from scratch.  The new world, unlike the more established old world, did not
have a financial system or large pools of money to borrow or lend.  The first
bank created in the new world, the Bank of Pennsylvania, was a public bank
created to aid the cash-strapped colonies in feeding the troops during the
Revolutionary War.14  The first national bank, the Bank of North America,
was approved by Congress in 1781 and was formed by private and foreign
funds.15  Alexander Hamilton, a then twenty-four-year-old soldier and vocal
advocate of establishing a national bank, wrote, “Tis by introducing order
into our finances—by restoring public credit—not by gaining battles, that we
are finally to gain our object.”16  His time in the army had convinced him
that “military operations could not be made more effective without more
money, and more money could not be procured without new means.”17  The
Bank of Pennsylvania was a public enterprise,18 but did not become the
“national bank” it was intended to be and was slowly “absorbed [into] private
business.”19  Nevertheless, Hamilton argued that banks, “within reasonable
limits, ought to consider it as a principle object to promote beneficial public
purposes.”20  When Alexander Hamilton responded to President Washing-
ton’s inquiry about the advisability of a national bank, he wrote that “such a
Bank is not a mere matter of private property, but a political machine of the
greatest importance to the State.”21
14 Robert Morris said the bank was “‘in fact nothing more than a patriotic subscription
of continental money . . . for the purpose of purchasing provisions for a starving army.’”
BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA 45 (1957) (alteration in original) (quot-
ing ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 233 (H.C. Lodge ed.,
1904)).
15 Id. at 50.
16 Id. at 47 (internal quotation marks omitted).
17 Id. at 40.
18 Id. at 46–51.
19 Id. at 63.
20 Id. at 76.
21 Final Version of the Second Report on the Further Provision Necessary for Establishing Public
Credit: Report on a National Bank (Dec. 13, 1790), in 7 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON
236, 329 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1963).
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The first few banks of the new world were started as public entities that
would meet the credit demands of the public and the new government.  By
1790, four banks were in business in four cities—Philadelphia, New York,
Boston, and Baltimore22—and “each bank was a public bank; that is, it was
distinctly more than a private institution.  Though its active management was
private, it was bound as well as enfranchised by governmental authority, and
the state was as often as not a shareholder.”23  Bray Hammond, the leading
expert on early U.S. banking describes the arrangement as such: “[T]he com-
munity, whether shrewdly or not, had adapted private initiative and wealth to
public purposes, granting privileges and exacting duties in
return. . . . [T]here persisted a strong conviction that a charter was a cove-
nant . . . .”24  Thus, the founders and early colonial governments viewed
banks as a “unique institution” that was a “public” good.25
Public opinion toward banking was mixed, but there was widespread sus-
picion of bank power and a distaste for banking that caused many to oppose
the creation of banks.  Alexander Hamilton was an early advocate of the
banks and Thomas Jefferson, an early opponent.26  But they advocated and
opposed banks, respectively, based on a similar understanding of the poten-
tial for banks to shape the economy and change society.  Hamilton recog-
nized that banks would be pivotal in turning an agrarian and rural economy
into an interconnected economy with central planning and development.  It
was this same transformation and the banks’ central role in it that Jefferson
opposed.27  Jefferson was not alone in his disdain for banks.  Most of the
public viewed banks as corrupt, lacking the commitment to agrarian thrift
and hard work that were representative of the early colonies.28  In 1811, for-
mer President John Adams wrote: “Our whole banking system I ever
abhorred, I continue to abhor, and shall die abhorring.”29  Similarly, in 1833,
William Gouge described banking as “the principal cause of social evil in the
United States.”30  He viewed banks’ vast monetary power and capabilities as a
privilege given to corporations and denied to individuals.31  This disdain for
banks dictated that the banks of the new world be kept under the supervision
of the state.
Such sentiments were rooted in the traditional agrarian beliefs that
feared concentrated monetary power.  Thus, there was widespread fear of
banking monopolies or conglomerates that would amass political power and
22 HAMMOND, supra note 14, at 66; see also RICHARD S. GROSSMAN, UNSETTLED ACCOUNT
221 (2010) (noting that prior to 1790, the United States only had four commercial banks).
23 HAMMOND, supra note 14, at 67.
24 Id. (emphasis added).
25 Id. at 68.
26 Although Thomas Jefferson’s opposition came to an end as he recognized the bene-
fits of banking to the country. GROSSMAN, supra note 22, at 225.
27 SUSAN HOFFMANN, POLITICS AND BANKING 22–25 (2001).
28 HAMMOND, supra note 14, at 35.
29 Id. at 36 (internal quotation marks omitted).
30 Id. at 37 (internal quotation marks omitted).
31 HOFFMANN, supra note 27, at 61–62.
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influence and wield it to thwart the budding democracy.32  Banks were
described as
artificial creature[s] endowed with powers not possessed by human beings
and incompatible with the principles of a democratic social order. . . .
“Th[e] institution, having no principle but that of avarice, which dries and
shrivels up all the manly, all the generous feelings of the human soul, will
never be varied in its object and if continued will accomplish its end, viz., to
engross all the wealth, power and influence of the state.”33
Early supporters of banks, such as Thomas Paine, believed that banks
would strengthen the nation by facilitating commerce.34  The public would
benefit and the economy would prosper, Paine argued, by the increased effi-
ciency in trade facilitated by banking.35  Many people in burgeoning regions,
incited by the colonial mercantilist spirit of capitalism, hailed banks for play-
ing a central role in the “wondrous growth” of American communities.36
This formative tension between traditional agrarian morality and the new
mercantilist spirit of laissez-faire shaped the evolution of the social contract.
As banking developed in the early nation-building era, so did ideological
conflict between banks as self-interested commercial enterprises and banks as
public entities with compromises on both sides.37  Banks would be allowed to
expand, but they would have to honor a distinctively public mission.
1. The First and Second Bank of the United States
The debates over the First and Second Banks of the United States have
filled volumes.  This Article will not recapitulate complex national dialogue
involved in the chartering of these two institutions.  Instead, it will focus on a
point of central importance here: these banks were viewed as public-serving
institutions that would help the country in many ways, including by standard-
izing American currency.  During the debates over the first and second
national banks, policymakers on both sides recognized that centralized bank-
ing could be used to solve formidable national problems with regard to the
32 Id. at 40.
33 HAMMOND, supra note 14, at 54–55 (quoting William Findley).
34 See id. at 60.
35 Id.  Thomas Paine wrote,
[T]he principal public use of [the bank] at this time is for the promotion and
extension of commerce.  The whole community derives benefit from the opera-
tion of the bank.  It facilitates the commerce of the country.  It quickens the
means of purchasing and paying for country produce and hastens on the exporta-
tion of it.  The emolument, therefore, being to the community, it is the office and
duty of government to give protection to the bank.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
36 See generally id. at 7–39, 629–30 (describing the conversion from hard-money idealis-
tic agrarianism to unanimous support of cheap credit and easy money).
37 See id. at 64 (stating that “the conflict of principles and interests—economic, social,
moral, and political—in that first lustrum was to recur often and far more momentously in
the country’s later history”).
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money supply.38  Scholars have noted that these early banks “shared a com-
mon purpose: advancement of the commonwealth through [their] assistance
to economic progress.”39
a. Federal Instrumentality
The federal instrumentality doctrine40 was first introduced in McCulloch
v. Maryland, where Chief Justice Marshall declared unconstitutional a state
38 HOFFMANN, supra note 27, at 46 (“Congress established the second Bank of the
United States to provide a uniform currency, intending thereby to bring economic chaos
under control for the benefit of the government and the people.”).  The second bank of
the United States was built not only to handle the monetary affairs of the central govern-
ment, but was also explicitly charged with improving the economy.  The interests of the
general public were integral to the bank’s design. Id. at 50.
39 HOWARD BODENHORN, A HISTORY OF BANKING IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 31 (2000).
40 The doctrine of national banks as federal instrumentalities is still in force but has
lost the meaning it had when national banks were first created.  The doctrine of federal
instrumentality is a constitutional principle permitting Congress to immunize certain pri-
vate entities, such as banks, from state taxation or control.  It extends the doctrine of pre-
emption—that federal law may constitutionally supersede state law—to protect not only
federal agencies from state law but also private entities functioning as federal instrumental-
ities.  The most important factor distinguishing an ordinary private entity from a tax-
immune federal instrumentality is whether it performs “an important governmental func-
tion.”  Fed. Land Bank v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 102–03 (1941) (quoting Fed.
Land Bank v. Priddy, 295 U.S. 229, 231 (1935)).  The Supreme Court has consistently
classified national banks as federal instrumentalities.  The McCulloch and Osborn principles
flourished even after the Bank of the United States expired and the National Banking Acts
(NBA) of 1863 and of 1864 initiated a new system of privately owned national banks.
National Banking Act of 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99; National Banking Act of 1863, ch. 58, 12
Stat. 665. See generally Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824) (reaffirm-
ing that state taxes may not be levied on the national bank, which is a federal instrumental-
ity); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (holding that Congress has the
power to create a national bank that is exempt from state taxation due to its status as a
federal instrumentality).  The NBA codified the status of several banking institutions as
federal instrumentalities. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 484 (2006) (exempting national banks from
state visitorial powers); 12 U.S.C. § 531 (2006) (prohibiting the taxation of federal reserve
banks); 12 U.S.C. § 1433 (2012) (exempting federal home loan banks from taxation gener-
ally); 12 U.S.C. § 1464 (2012) (limiting discriminatory local taxation on federal savings
associations).  Several turn-of-the-century cases further affirmed that banks under the NBA
were, like their predecessors, immune from state control because they had important fed-
eral responsibilities. See, e.g., Easton v. Iowa, 188 U.S. 220, 229 (1903) (explaining national
banks were “independent, so far as powers conferred are concerned, of state legislation”);
Davis v. Elmira Sav. Bank, 161 U.S. 275, 288 (1896) (“[W]e should thus have to consider all
the deposits as made with an implication that they were subject to federal law, and hence
the conflict between the two laws would become evident, and the federal law, being para-
mount, would prevail.”); Mercantile Bank v. New York, 121 U.S. 138, 154 (1887) (explain-
ing the banks were “exempted from the power of the States in this respect, because these
banks were means and agencies established by Congress in execution of the powers of the
government of the United States”); Farmers’ & Mechs.’ Nat’l Bank v. Dearing, 91 U.S. 29,
34–35 (1875) (holding that banks are in the category of private entities that can be taxed
by states, but only with the express or implied consent of Congress).  These decisions
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\89-3\NDL306.txt unknown Seq: 9 17-FEB-14 14:20
2014] banking  and  the  social  contract 1291
rested on the government’s practical need for national banks to fulfill public obligations to
finance the national government, control monetary policy, strengthen national unity, and
offer lending and savings services. See, e.g., Farmers’ & Mechs.’ Nat’l Bank, 91 U.S. at 33–34
(noting that “[t]he national banks organized under [the NBA] are instruments designed
to be used to aid the government in the administration of an important branch of the
public service.  They are means appropriate to that end. . . . States can exercise no control
over them, nor in any wise affect their operation, except in so far as Congress may see
proper to permit”).  In Mercantile Bank v. New York, for example, the Court upheld a por-
tion of the NBA that prohibited any state from imposing discriminatory taxes on national
banks. Mercantile Bank, 121 U.S. at 154–55.  The Court explained that national banks are
privy to special protection because “[t]he object of [the NBA] was to establish a system of
national banking institutions, in order to provide a uniform and secure currency for the
people, and to facilitate the operations of the Treasury of the United States.” Id. at 154.
The practical role of banks changed, however, with the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 and
the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, which relieved national banks of many governmental
responsibilities.  See Watters v. Wachovia Bank, 550 U.S. 1, 27 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (describing how both acts ultimately relaxed federal limits on mortgage lending by
national banks and shifted monetary and financial responsibilities to the Federal Reserve
and FDIC).  Banks chartered under the NBA no longer carried a social obligation to pro-
vide the government monetary services, and debate arose in the following decades about
the extent to which banks should enjoy continued instrumentality status. See, e.g., First
Agric. Nat’l Bank v. State Tax Comm’n, 392 U.S. 339, 362–63 (1968) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) (noting that the doctrine can be read broadly or narrowly and that the majority had
adopted a broad reading and that the narrow reading would prohibit only discriminatory
state taxation of national banks, whereas the broad reading prohibits any state taxation of
national banks unless Congress allows it).  Nonetheless, the Court has maintained that
national banks are federal instrumentalities and immune from state laws that undermine
the NBA purposes. See Watters, 550 U.S. at 11.  The Court repeatedly has held that national
banks deserve immunity based on their “performance of [important] governmental func-
tions.” See First Agric. Nat’l Bank, 392 U.S. at 353 (quoting Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316
U.S. 481, 485 (1942)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The doctrine and theoretical
test for ascertaining federal instrumentalities remained virtually unchanged, as the Court
continued to affirm the McCulloch reasoning throughout the 1900s and as recently as 2007.
See, e.g., Watters, 550 U.S. at 10–11, 21 (holding that subsidiaries of national banks qualify
for immunity from state taxation based on McCulloch and its nineteenth-century progeny);
Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 11 (2003) (noting that the principles of
federal instrumentality enumerated in McCulloch and its progeny are still applicable to
grant national banks certain tax immunity today); see also Unemployment Comp. Comm’n
v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 2 S.E.2d 592, 596 (N.C. 1939) (noting that when consider-
ing whether to apply the doctrine of federal instrumentalities, courts consider whether an
entity is “perform[ing an important] governmental function”).  Throughout its develop-
ment, however, the doctrine became more abstract.  The Court noted in United States v.
New Mexico: “As the federal structure—along with the workings of the tax immunity doc-
trine—has evolved, [the McCulloch directive] has taken on essentially symbolic importance
as the visible ‘consequence of that [federal] supremacy which the constitution has
declared.’”  455 U.S. 720, 735 (1982) (second alteration in original) (footnote omitted)
(quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 436).  That is, the federal instrumentality doc-
trine applies as much to national banks today as it did to the Second Bank of the United
States in McCulloch.  The Court continues to expressly recognize that national banks are
federal instrumentalities, which shields them from a variety of state tax and regulatory
directives, but the Court does not enumerate the important governmental functions per-
formed by banks.  Rather, banks are federal instrumentalities because they serve a vague
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tax on the Second Bank of the United States41 because the bank was an
“instrument employed by the government.”42  Because Congress established
the bank with a purpose of fostering a unified national economy, federal
instrumentality status was necessary to protect the special relationship
between the bank and the nation from state intrusion.43  The Court rejected
the state’s contention that a bank was not a federal instrumentality because it
had mostly private ownership and functioned as a commercial bank.44  The
bank and its branches were federal instrumentalities, exempt from state taxa-
tion despite private ownership, because they were chartered by the govern-
ment to serve the public.45  Landmark cases like McCulloch reveal that the
earliest concept of federal instrumentality rested on the fact that Congress
created a Bank of the United States to expressly and practically serve public
economic needs.
2. Banking Regulation
Even early on, the proponents of banks had at least some sense that
banks must be saved from themselves in some matters.  Thus, Hamilton laid
out basic limitations on bank liabilities.46  “The early years of the republic are
often spoken of as if the era were one of laisser faire in which governmental
authority refrained from interference in business and benevolently left it a
free field.  Nothing of the sort was true of banking.”47  As a result, these early
state banks were inherently linked to their sponsoring government.  This was
social responsibility of upholding a historical concept of federal supremacy.  Cf. Watters,
550 U.S. at 11–14 (discussing how federal supremacy for national banks prevents state
regulation of a bank’s prescribed powers).  For further analysis of the modern doctrine,
see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Exorcising McCulloch: The Conflict-Ridden History of American Bank-
ing Nationalism and Dodd-Frank Preemption (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory
Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 12-45, 2012).
41 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 436; see The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARV. L.
REV. 63, 284 (1968) (discussing the continued application of McCulloch).
42 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 436–37.
43 Chief Justice Marshall declared that federal instrumentalities needed protection
from state taxation because “the power to tax involves the power to destroy.” Id. at 431.  In
another early case, Osborn, the Court reaffirmed McCulloch in holding that a state cannot
tax the Bank of the United States. Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 867–68.
44 In fact, four-fifths of the bank’s starting capital was provided by private investors and
government control of the bank was restricted. JOHN THOM HOLDSWORTH & DAVIS R.
DEWEY, THE FIRST AND SECOND BANKS OF THE UNITED STATES, S. DOC. NO. 61-571, at 152–53
(2d Sess. 1910).
45 See Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 769 (“This public benefit may consist of the facili-
ties afforded to the State, in the management of its fiscal concerns; or it may consist in the
convenience to the community in the transaction of mercantile and other money affairs.  It
may arise from the payment of annual revenue, or a stipulated sum, into the public trea-
sury. . . . ‘The character of civil institutions does not grow out of their incorporation, but
out of the manner in which they are formed, and the objects for which they are created.’”
(quoting Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 638 (1819))).
46 HAMMOND, supra note 14, at 132.
47 Id. at 185.
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also because they were modeled after the public banks of the old world, such
as the Bank of England, whose primary purpose was to serve the state.48
During the nineteenth century, banks were primarily chartered by states
as opposed to the federal government.49  And state governments, in keeping
with past practice, relied on banks to perform necessary economic func-
tions.50  One historian asserts: “In practice state legislatures viewed banking
corporations as instrumentalities of the state, established to serve various
public purposes as well as the private interests of stockholders and borrow-
ers.”51  Indeed, this conception of banking as a state instrumentality contin-
ued into the early twentieth century.  In Schaake v. Dolley, a 1911 case where
Kansas denied a banking charter because the local economy could not sup-
port another bank, the Kansas Supreme Court explained that banking is not
“a matter of private concern only, like the business of the merchant, and for
all purposes of legislative regulation and control it may be said to be ‘affected
with a public interest.’”52  The court emphasized that, because of the posi-
tion of banks as recipients of the “public patronage,” they become “a trustee
of the fiscal affairs of the people and of the state.”53  The court made clear
that banking needed to be distinguished from “ordinary private business”
because of its “public nature,” which made banking “properly subject to the
police power of the state.”54
In particular, early state laws attempted to keep banks small and short
lived, in keeping with widely held fears of concentrated economic power.55
New York banking laws, for example, set maximum capital standards, and
most bank charters came with expiration dates.  Legislatures renewed the
charters subject to conditions or most commonly denied requests for charter
extensions.56  In addition, state law imposed participation requirements to
prevent privately controlled banks from being dominated by a few individuals
48 Id. at 68.  “[B]anking regulations in the United States were, by both nineteenth- and
twentieth-century standards, quite restrictive, resulting in a banking system characterized
by a large number of small banks.” GROSSMAN, supra note 22, at 222.
49 HOFFMANN, supra note 27, at 71.
50 States chartered banks to perform a variety of public purposes, such as “to provide
credit for trade, manufacturing, and agriculture; to provide circulating medium for every
day economic transactions; to act as the fiscal agent of the state; to generate revenue for
state government operations, obviating the need for taxation; to finance public improve-
ments; and to regulate other banks in the state.” Id. at 72.
51 Id. at 87.  “In authorizing them, legislators knew they were providing economic and
social infrastructure; they did so with explicit attention to having enough for everyone; and
their purposes included deliberate geographic and functional allocation.” Id. at 90.
52 Schaake v. Dolley, 118 P. 80, 83 (Kan. 1911).
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 GROSSMAN, supra note 22, at 222.
56 HOFFMANN, supra note 27, at 78.  “Prospective bankers had to lobby the legislature
in order to be granted a charter; they might be successful if they were, in the view of the
legislature, of good character and if the legislature felt that the area needed another
bank.” GROSSMAN, supra note 22, at 138.
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or economic interests.57  In short, states allowed banks to profit, but they also
acted to limit banks’ power and size in the interest of serving the public
good.58
3. The Civil War
A major change in banking was precipitated by the Civil War: the great
stresses caused by the conflict spurred the re-entry of the federal government
into bank chartering and regulation.59  A lack of government credit and
funding in the face of war compelled President Lincoln and Treasury Secre-
tary Salmon Chase to loosen the Jacksonian treasury requirements, which for-
bade the national government from regulating the monetary system using
bank notes or adopting modern credit practices.60  The war created such a
financial burden on the government that it had to borrow money from state
banks.61  The federal government turned to the banks of New York, Boston,
and Philadelphia to finance the war and borrow money.  Indeed, the U.S.
treasury depended entirely on private state bankers for money.62  This
dependence led the federal government to push for a transition from species
to paper currency, which would require more trust in the banking system and
a stronger tie between banks and the federal government.  In recognizing its
need to expand federal power, the North made unprecedented assertions of
federal power through the Legal Tender and National Currency Acts of 1862
and 1863.  The federal government’s transition to paper money represented
57 HOFFMANN, supra note 27, at 78.
58 Although there is certainly support for the proposition that banking and the state
were intertwined in early American history, there is also some evidence that in some states
banking was less regulated than today and these banks were purely driven by profit.  The
United States had a brief period of free banking from 1836 to 1863 where there was no
national bank and states allowed relatively easy entry into banking.  Free banking, which
was originally implemented in New York and replicated elsewhere, was “an application of
laisser faire to the monetary function. . . . It broke with the Hamiltonian concept of banking
and the principle that supervision of banking as a monetary function was a responsibility of
the federal government.” HAMMOND, supra note 14, at 573.  Many banks were formed dur-
ing this time and some came to be called “wildcat banks” because many were located in
rural locations and operated outside the purview of the law. RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET
AL., THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 7–8 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 4th ed.
2009); GROSSMAN, supra note 22, at 139.  Most scholars view this short-lived era as a failure
although that assessment is not uncontested. CARNELL ET AL., supra; see HAMMOND, supra
note 14, at 599 (“The results of this Jacksonian [laissez faire] revolution were obvious in
monetary inflation, in speculation, in wasted labor, in business failures, in abandonment of
an efficient means of credit control, and in corruption of a sound monetary system.”).
59 See BRAY HAMMOND, SOVEREIGNTY AND AN EMPTY PURSE 359 (1970) (“The South’s
rebellion was an extreme version . . . of what Maryland . . . tried to do . . . about the federal
Bank of the United States . . . .”).
60 The Independent Treasury Act of 1846 forbade the national government from regu-
lating the monetary system, using bank notes, or adopting modern credit practices. Id. at
20–21.
61 See id. at 38–39.
62 Id.
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how banks and the government needed to work together to promote
national economic growth, stability, and well-being.63
The currency debates highlight the philosophical underpinnings of the
banks’ developing relationship with the government, as “the idea for a
national banking system and for a national currency became synonymous to
people.”64  Banking policy was, in many respects, as politically controversial
and deeply rooted as the issue of slavery because it came to represent the
tension between state and federal power.  Arguments against a national cur-
rency and a national banking system paralleled those used in defense of
secession.  Many challenged the constitutionality of Treasury Secretary
Chase’s proposal for national banks, which would be “subordinate to con-
gressional authority and wholly independent of the state legislatures.”65  Yet
“the new spirit of nationalism being fostered by the war” led others to believe
that public welfare required a national banking system.66  Newspapers like
The New York Times supported a nationalized legal tender because it was an
assertion of the nation’s constitutional sovereign power that affirmed the
principles the union stood for.67  Critics believed that national banking and
currency would make wealthy men wealthier and would press states into fed-
eral servitude.68
The establishment of national banking and a national currency was the
birth of the partnership between the federal government and banks to enact
monetary policy.  National banks were created for this purpose and were
treated as “federal instrumentalities,” or tools of the federal government to
accomplish its aims.  The process of replacing state bank notes with a
national paper money system would force banks to assume responsibility for
the nation’s economic survival by making banks carry out the government’s
monetary policy.69  A well-regulated national banking system would be
“relied upon to carry the nation through its financial difficulties.”70
63 Id. at 97 (“[T]he perfection of economy in time, labor and expense would seem to
have been attained in a [paper] currency worthy of and honorable to Christian civiliza-
tion . . . .” (quoting Editorial, N.Y. TRIBUNE, Jan. 25, 1862) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
64 Id. at 143 (“[T]he national bank system was spoken of as a national currency, the
means and the end being confused in men’s minds . . . .”).
65 LETTER FROM THE SEC’Y OF THE TREASURY, H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 37-25, at 95 (1863).
66 HAMMOND, supra note 59, at 144.
67 Id. at 204 (“All persons ‘who regard the government as anything more than a con-
federation of states to be broken or weakened at will by secession or rebellion—all who
believe the federal authority a power for the general good of the whole people as well as
the symbol of sovereignty and allegiance—will welcome this resumption of one of its most
important rights and duties . . . .’” (alteration in original) (quoting N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6,
1862)).
68 Id. at 189.
69 Id. at 142.
70 Id. at 177 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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***
In sum, banks and banking in the United States were initiated to support
the early colonies, then the states, and then the nation and the union.  Banks
were chartered and regulated to fulfill state or national policies aimed at
benefitting the public as a whole in ways that reached far beyond merely
ensuring a thriving and profitable banking industry.  Although there was lit-
tle in the way of an explicit social contract during the early colonial and post-
Civil War era, from the beginning, public issues were fought on the turf of
banking policy.  Although there was no government safety net during this
time, the granting of a bank charter and the use of banks for monetary policy
were ways in which the banks and the government relied on each other.  This
idea of conceptual unity carried with it, in its nature, a recognition that banks
were subject to governmental control.  And in fact many controls were
imposed, especially restrictions on bank size.  There was, however, a deep
problem with this form of the banking social contract: it left banks open to
failures that resulted from financial mismanagement and bank runs.71  This
problem manifested itself with catastrophic consequences during the Great
Depression.
B. The Great Depression and the New Deal
The Great Depression and the New Deal that followed marked a pivotal
moment in American regulatory history.  And no sector was affected more
than banking.  If public opinion toward banks was skeptical before the 1930s,
it turned outright hostile during the 1930s as the American people faced
unprecedented suffering due to bank failures across the nation.  In Other Peo-
ple’s Money Louis Brandeis made the case against the newly developed
“Money Trusts,” or investment banks and bankers, whose goals he saw as to
exact inordinate securities underwriting fees and enrich themselves through
the use of the deposits of the middle class.72  This view mirrored that of
Thomas Jefferson nearly a century earlier.73  The problem with this oligar-
chy, Brandeis argued, was that it would lead to injuries inflicted on the very
people whose deposits were used to secure such dominant positions.74
Another, no less serious, evil was the Money Trust’s success in suppressing
competition and innovation.75
Brandeis criticized the disproportionate influence investment bankers
wielded from their control of other people’s money.76  “If the bankers’
power were commensurate only with their wealth, they would have relatively
71 GROSSMAN, supra note 22, at 230–45.
72 LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY 12 (Richard M. Abrams ed., 1967).
73 “I believe that banking institutions are more dangerous to our liberties than stand-
ing armies . . . .” Private Banks (Quotation), THE JEFFERSON MONTICELLO, http://www.monti-
cello.org/site/jefferson/private-banks-quotation (last visited Nov. 19, 2013).
74 BRANDEIS, supra note 72, at 18–19, 46.
75 Id. at 33.
76 Id. at 12.
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little influence on American business.”77  Instead, the large investment banks
of the time controlled, either directly or indirectly, a staggering twenty-two
billion dollars, more than three times the value of all property, real and per-
sonal, in all of New England.78  With large investments in American business,
including railroads, industrial corporations, and life insurance companies,
banks and their investment bankers requested directorships on company
boards.  J.P. Morgan himself held seventy-two directorships in forty-seven of
the largest corporations in the country.79  The other two banks stood not far
behind.  Here was Jefferson’s worst fear coming to pass.
In addition to recommending conflict-of-interest legislation that would
deter banker directorships, Brandeis suggested a more fundamental solu-
tion—turning banks into public-service corporations.80  Comparing them to
the country’s railways, then an essential utility of commerce, he argued that
banks should be treated not as private business, but as a public service.  “The
dependence of commerce and industry upon bank deposits, as the common
reservoir of quick capital is so complete, that deposit banking should be rec-
ognized as one of the businesses ‘affected with a public interest.’”81  Brandeis
quoted Senator Owen, Chairman of the Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency, to add historical support for this suggested transformation:
My own judgment is that a bank is a public-utility institution and cannot be
treated as a private affair, for the simple reason that the public is invited,
under the safeguards of the government, to deposit its money with the bank,
and the public has a right to have its interests safeguarded through organ-
ized authorities.  The logic is beyond escape.  All banks in the United States,
public and private, should be treated as public-utility institutions, where they
receive deposits.82
1. The New Deal Social Contract
Drawing in part on Brandeis’s concept, President Roosevelt seized on
the calamity of the Great Depression to initiate a new form of social contract
with banks.  The government decided that it needed a stable banking system
that was not prone to conglomeration and excessive power.  Therefore, it put
in place activity restrictions, enforced antitrust rules, and provided a govern-
ment safety net in exchange for federal support.  This safety net would mini-
mize banks’ vulnerability to runs, a contagion that had quickly spread across
the banking sector.  Banks vigorously opposed Roosevelt’s imposition of
77 Id. at 12–13.
78 Id. at 22–23.  The key to this control lied in combinations.  J.P. Morgan & Co., along
with two New York banks, National City and First National, constituted the Money Trust.
Id. at 24.
79 Id. at 22.
80 Id. at 43–44.
81 Id. at 44.
82 Id. Justice Brandeis conceded that even if the state did not take on nationalized
banking, private banking could compete efficiently in the market if it could focus on peo-
ple instead of profits, which they termed “democratic banking.” Id. at 146.
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activity restrictions as well as deposit insurance, but President Roosevelt used
the public’s anger at the banks to catalyze public and legislative support for
these measures.83
The most important and most comprehensive demands on banks had to
do with making banks less risky by keeping them from engaging in nonbank-
ing, or commercial activities.  The Glass-Steagall Act limited banking activity
to traditional bank functions and prohibited banks from engaging in riskier
activities, such as underwriting and proprietary trading.84  These controls
were aimed at keeping banks small and constraining their market foot-
print.85  The second part of this implicit deal made with banks after the
Great Depression focused on using banks to promote public objectives, spe-
cifically by increasing access to credit.86  Roosevelt recognized that banks had
public-serving functions and aggressively enlisted them to meet public needs.
The government chartered specific banking institutions that would play
a major part in aiding the poor and middle class in buying homes and provid-
ing access to low-cost credit.  Congress established the Federal Home Loan
Bank System in 1932 to promote homeownership in the United States.87  In
addition, Congress created the Federal Credit Union Act to charter and regu-
late federal credit unions with the primary mission of lending to consumers,
not businesses.88  The National Housing Act was also created to provide fed-
eral funds to support Savings and Loan Associations specifically charged with
financing home purchases.89  In addition, Fannie Mae was chartered as a
government organization to aid in the underwriting of home mortgages to
enable home ownership by more of the public.90
Although some banks aimed to serve the poor before the Great Depres-
sion, the New Deal solidified their place in the national economy and gave
them a formal charge that would be backed by governmental support.
Unfortunately, these banks also ceased to fulfill their obligations to the poor
during the 1980s during the deregulation that homogenized banking.91
These banks could not maintain profitability in the face of the market
changes during the 1980s.  And because the social contract forged during the
83 GROSSMAN, supra note 22, at 246 (speaking to the panic caused by bank crisis).
84 Glass-Steagall Act (Banking Act of 1933), Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162; GROSSMAN,
supra note 22, at 247–48.
85 GROSSMAN, supra note 22, at 250.
86 See infra notes 87–90 and accompanying text.
87 See Federal Home Loan Bank Act, Pub. L. No. 72-304, 47 Stat. 725 (1932).
88 Federal Credit Union Act, Pub. L. No. 73-467, 48 Stat. 1216 (1933).
89 JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 23
(1997); 1 FDIC, Savings and Loan Crisis and Its Relationship to Banking, in HISTORY OF THE
EIGHTIES 170 (1997).
90 Andrea J. Boyack, Laudable Goals and Unintended Consequences: The Role and Control of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1489, 1495 (2011).  Freddie Mac was
chartered in 1970. Company Profile, FREDDIE MAC, http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/
company_profile/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2013).
91 Mehrsa Baradaran, How the Poor Got Cut Out of Banking, 62 EMORY L.J. 483, 487
(2013).
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New Deal had eroded by that time, the government did not step in to subsi-
dize these failing banks.92
The social contract forged during the Great Depression stabilized U.S.
banking for several decades.  The banking sector grew steadily from 1933
until the mid-1970s without experiencing any financial panic or collapse.93
Banks operated conservatively and regulators, unchallenged, enforced the
Glass-Steagall Act and other New Deal regulatory mandates.94  During this
time, banking regulation was motivated by the goal of soundness and stability
and the policy goal of directing credit toward public-serving goals that were
deemed worthwhile.  These aims were achieved through anticompetitive reg-
ulations and activity restrictions, which protected banking stability and profit-
ability, but which also stifled financial innovation.  During this era, banks
were stable and profitable.  Therefore, neither the government nor the bank-
ing industry agitated for a change of policy.
***
In sum, the Great Depression and the New Deal that followed led to the
first wave of comprehensive activity restrictions imposed on banks.  This New
Deal era social contract with banks focused on safety and soundness, which
was meant to protect depositors as well as the United States economy from
catastrophic bank failure.95  For the first time, the federal government pro-
vided federally funded deposit insurance to prevent confidence-destroying
runs from wreaking havoc on banks.96  In return, the federal government
imposed a framework of banking controls intended to minimize the moral
hazard effects of deposit insurance and to protect the insurance fund from
losses.97  Moral hazard is defined as a “lack of incentive to guard against risk
92 For a more comprehensive discussion of why these banks stopped fulfilling their
public-serving mission, see id.
93 GROSSMAN, supra note 22, at 251.
94 Id. at 250–51.
95 Id. at 247–49 (cataloguing the most important banking reforms initiated during the
aftermath of the Great Depression: deposit insurance, the separation of banking and com-
merce, and interest rate ceilings).
96 Lee J. Alston et al., Why Do Banks Fail?: Evidence from the 1920s, 31 EXPLORATIONS IN
ECON. HIST. 409, 415–18 (1994) (discussing the evolution of federal insurance for banks,
including deposit insurance); see also David C. Wheelock, Regulation, Market Structure, and
the Bank Failures of the Great Depression, 77 FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 27, 27 (1995),
available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/article/3165 (“[G]overn-
ment policies, such as . . . deposit insurance, appear to have had measurable impacts on
market outcomes and bank failures during the Great Depression.”).
97 See Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and
Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401, 402 (1983) (showing that banking is unstable without
deposit insurance); see also Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir., Fin. Stability, Bank of Eng., &
Piergiogio Alessandri, Banking on the State: Presentation at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago Twelfth Annual International Banking Conference on The International Finan-
cial Crisis: Have the Rules of Finance Changed? 4 (Sept. 25, 2009), available at http://www.
bis.org/review/r091111e.pdf (explaining that the reason deposit insurance was introduced
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when one is protected from its consequences.”98  These controls on banks
resulted in reduced bank size and influence as well as a marked reduction in
bank failures for over fifty years.99
The New Deal social contract kept the banking system safe and func-
tional as the country developed a modern economy.  The state needed banks
to be reliable and banking regulation in that era achieved that purpose.  The
banking sector experienced measured growth and success while the rest of
the economy generally thrived.  Such an arrangement cannot be replicated
today, despite some calls to do so, because the financial sector has grown
much larger and more complex.100  What can be emulated is the articulated
quid pro quo established between banks and the government that assured
that banks would do what the government needed them to do, and the gov-
ernment’s return promise to provide a safety net and restore public trust in
banking.
2. Civil Rights and the Social Contract for Equality
The social contract initiated during the Great Depression was amended
during the Civil Rights era to make the nation’s banks responsive to the gov-
ernment’s goals of racial equality.  What the Civil Rights era reforms added
to this public-protecting conception of the government/banking relationship
was that the social contract had to work to protect all members of the public,
not just some.  This amendment reinforced the relationship between the gov-
ernment and the banks initiated during the New Deal by simply expanding
the public benefits that that relationship produced.  In keeping with the goal
of ensuring benefits to the public—as opposed to only some favored members
of it—a new set of laws emerged, which increased access to credit by eliminat-
ing discrimination in lending and banking services.
There were over twenty civil rights reforms between 1968 and 1988 that
declared and implemented citizens’ “right” to bank without discrimina-
tion.101  The largest and most important were the Fair Housing Act of 1968
in the United States was to protect depositors from the bank runs experienced during the
Great Depression).
98 Moral Hazard, NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010).
99 GROSSMAN, supra note 22, at 232–37, 240, 266 (outlining the numerous bank fail-
ures that occurred between 1873 and 1932 in contrast to how few occurred after that
time).
100 Id. at 2.
101 See, e.g., Women’s Business Ownership Act of 1988, Pub L. No. 100-533, 102 Stat.
2689 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 631 (2006)) (affording women who own busi-
nesses protection against discrimination based on gender, such as requiring a legitimate
justification for denying credit); Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-128,
91 Stat. 1147 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901–2909 (2012)) (stating that regu-
lated banking institutions must show that they are meeting the credit need within the com-
munities they do business, including low to moderate income community members);
Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-367, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2301 (2006)) (giving the Federal Reserve the power to
identify unfair practices, including discrimination, and construct regulations to prohibit
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(FHA), Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974 (ECOA), the Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act of 1975 (HMDA), and the Community Reinvestment Act of
1977 (CRA).102  The civil rights reforms oblige banks to foster economic
equality and to refrain from discrimination against customers or neighbor-
hoods.  These reforms focused on removing barriers to credit for people of
color as well as low-income communities.  This imposition of normative val-
ues on banks was premised on the importance of banking services to all
members of all communities.
These reforms reflected both an extension of the civil rights legislation
of the era as well as a response to market conditions.  As the banking sector
suffered competition from the capital markets in the 1970s and 1980s, banks
increasingly shed lower income and minority customers and closed branches
in low income neighborhoods in order to cut costs, a process called “redlin-
ing.”103  The effect was a cyclical decline due to lack of credit in these com-
munities.  Businesses left, people lost jobs, banks continued to close, and
crime increased, accelerating the downward spiral.104  Many of these commu-
nities have yet to recover from the exodus of businesses caused by bank
departures that occurred during that era.  The new laws were in part framed
to induce banks to avoid business decisions that imposed negative externali-
ties on already-disadvantaged people and communities, and thereby frus-
trated the government’s efforts to address historic discrimination.
In addition to market forces, there was also evidence of discrimination
in lending.105  If access to credit enables people to escape poverty, these anti-
discrimination policies were meant to ensure that a portion of the popula-
tion was not stunted economically from upward mobility.106  The CRA, cou-
pled with several other Civil Rights era legislative acts, was the first time the
government explicitly mandated that banks take action in these communities
and combat discrimination.  When introducing the Senate bill that would
and enforce against these unfair acts); Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, Pub. L. No.
94-200, 89 Stat. 112 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801–2810 (2012)) (requiring
that depository institutions report the race, ethnicity, sex, and income of borrowers and
applicants and the prices on these loans to ensure that discriminatory practices are not
being pursued); Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (1968) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2006)) (making it unlawful to discriminate on the
basis of “race, color, religion, or national origin” when extending housing credit); see also
David A. Skeel, Jr., Racial Dimensions of Credit and Bankruptcy, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1695,
1706–12 (2004) (detailing consumer protection measures in the 1970s).
102 Fair Housing Act, Pub L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (1968) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2006)); Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat.
1521 (1974) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2006)); Home Mortgage Disclo-
sure Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-200, 89 Stat. 1125 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 2801–2810 (2006)); Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-128, 91 Stat.
1147 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901–2909 (2006)).
103 JOHN P. CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING 133 (1994).
104 TRANSFORMING THE U.S. FINANCIAL SYSTEM 120 (Gary A. Dymski et al. eds., 1993).
105 DAN IMMERGLUCK, CREDIT TO THE COMMUNITY 64–65 (2004).
106 Geoffrey D. Korff, Reviving the Forgotten American Dream, 113 PENN. ST. L. REV. 417,
437 (2008).
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largely become the CRA, Senator Proxmire, Chairman of the Senate Com-
mittee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs commented that the bill was
based on a few “widely shared assumptions,” including the assumption that “a
public charter conveys numerous economic benefits and in return it is legiti-
mate for public policy and regulatory practice to require some public pur-
pose.”107  Later, the Chairman “compared a bank charter to a franchise to
serve local convenience and needs and suggested that it is fair for the public
to ask something in return.”108
The mandate that banking should be free of discrimination persists
today.  The Department of Justice has recently brought charges and eventu-
ally settled several cases against banks under the FHA and the ECOA for
discrimination against minority borrowers.  The Justice Department used the
controversial theory of “disparate impact,” which can establish wrongdoing
even without evidence of intentional discrimination as long as it can be
shown that minorities were statistically given inferior mortgages than whites
with similar economic backgrounds.109  The Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau has also embraced the theory, stating, “We cannot afford to tolerate
practices, intentional or not, that unlawfully price out or cut off segments of
the population from the credit markets.”110  The use of disparate impact
analysis in the lending context sent shockwaves through the banking
107 Warren L. Dennis, The Community Re-investment Act of 1977: Its Legislative History and
Its Impact on Applications for Changes in Structure Made by Depository Institutions to the Four
Federal Financial Supervisory Agencies 4 (Purdue University, Working Paper No. 24, 1978),
available at http://faculty.msb.edu/prog/CRC/pdf/wp24.pdf (internal quotation marks
omitted).
108 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  This contention was not without opposi-
tion.  Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller who penned the most influential criticism of the
CRA, contended that the CRA indeed inappropriately treats “depository institutions as
some form of public utility that can be assessed to serve general social needs.”  Jonathan R.
Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Community Reinvestment Act: An Economic Analysis, 79 VA. L.
REV. 291, 296 (1993).  Their argument was that if the government wants to subsidize the
poor, it should do so directly and leave banks out of it. Id.  They also claim that paradoxi-
cally, “[f]inancial services . . . can be afforded to low-income and moderate-income con-
sumers by further deregulation in the financial services industry.” Id.
109 Complaint, United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, 891 F. Supp. 2d 143 (D.D.C. 2012)
(No. 1:12-cv-01150), 2012 WL 2849496, available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/
resources/9512012712113719995136.pdf; Charlie Savage, Countrywide Will Settle a Bias Suit,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2011, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/22/busi-
ness/us-settlement-reported-on-countrywide-lending.html [hereinafter Savage, Country-
wide]; Charlie Savage, Wells Fargo Will Settle Mortgage Bias Charges, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2013,
at B3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/13/business/wells-fargo-to-settle-
mortgage-discrimination-charges.html [hereinafter Savage, Wells Fargo]; Press Release,
Dep’t of Justice, Justice Dep’t Reaches $21 Million Settlement to Resolve Allegations of
Lending Discrimination by Suntrust Mortgage (May 31, 2012), available at http://www.
justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/May/12-crt-695.html.
110 CFPB Embraces ‘Disparate Impact’ Theory of Discriminatory Lending, AM. BANKER (Apr.
18, 2012), http://www.americanbanker.com/video/cfpb-disparate-impact-discriminatory-
lending1048536-1.html.
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world.111  This was not the first time the Justice Department has used dispa-
rate impact to enforce the ECOA, however.  In 1994, the DOJ entered a con-
sent decree with a Washington D.C. bank for ignoring African American
communities in the D.C. area.112  Regulators defend the use of disparate
impact as a useful tool to prevent inequality in lending.113
Banking regulators see it as part of their mission to keep banking free
from discrimination.  For example, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion (FDIC) states that it is “committed to expanding economic inclusion in
the financial mainstream by ensuring that all Americans have access to safe,
secure, and affordable banking services.”114  The FDIC makes clear that this
guarantee applies only to banks and does not extend to other corporations
or nonbanking services.115
Equal access to credit has been an articulated and enforced tenet of the
banking regulatory framework for more than forty years.  Enforcing non-dis-
crimination in banking looks more like enforcing non-discrimination in pub-
lic utilities or common carriers than in other areas of commerce which the
government leaves largely to market norms with a floor of constitutional pro-
tection against discrimination.  The prevalence of these laws in banking does
not necessarily mean that banks should be viewed as public utilities.  How-
ever, they do show that the government views access to credit and banking
services as an important right that should be provided to all citizens without
unnecessary barriers.  This has implications in forming the new social con-
tract as outlined below.
111 Shannon Henry, FDIC Offers Self-Testing Guide to Help Lenders Root Out Bias, AM.
BANKER (Aug. 4, 1994), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/159_74/-43181-1.html;
Press Release, Frank Keating, Am. Bankers Ass’n, ABA Statement on Dep’t of Justice Use of
‘Disparate Impact,’ (July 12, 2012), http://www.aba.com/Press/Pages/071212DOJDispa-
rateImpact.aspx (ABA asking DOJ to stop using disparate impact); Press Release, Dep’t of
Justice, Justice Dep’t Reaches $335 Million Settlement to Resolve Allegations of Lending
Discrimination by Countrywide Financial Corporation (Dec. 21, 2011), available at http://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/December/11-ag-1694.html.
112 Consent Decree, United States v. Chevy Chase Fed. Sav. Bank (D.D.C., Aug. 22,
1994), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/hce/documents/chevychasesettle.
php.
113 James P. Scanlan, ‘Disparate Impact’: Regulators Need a Lesson in Statistics, AM. BANKER
(June 5, 2012), http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/disparate-impact-regulators-
need-a-lesson-in-statistics-1049886-1.html (highlighting “federal agencies’ failure to recog-
nize a fundamental statistical concept results in encouraging lenders to take actions that
make them more likely targets for litigation”).
114 What Is Economic Inclusion?, FDIC ECONOMIC INCLUSION, http://www.economicinclu-
sion.gov/whatis/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2013).
115 Id. (“Participation in the banking system also protects households from theft and
reduces their vulnerability to discriminatory or predatory lending practices.  In addition,
households that use non-bank financial services providers do not receive the full range of
consumer protections available through the banking system.”); see also Overview of Mortgage
Discrimination, FINANCIAL WEB, http://www.finweb.com/mortgage/overview-of-mortgage-
discrimination.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2013) (explaining federal policies implemented
to correct mortgage discrimination).
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C. Deregulation
Beginning in the late 1970s and 1980s, the banking sector started facing
an identity crisis.  After years of operating a safe and boring model dictated
by the regulations imposed during the New Deal, the model seemed to be
falling apart.  Due to technological advances and financial innovation, capital
markets and commercial paper markets started to offer safe and enticing
alternatives to bank customers and banks quickly started to lose market share
and profitability.116  There was something of a perfect storm that came
together in the 1980s.  In the same period, (1) some forms of deregulation
(e.g., of airlines) generated popularity and success; (2) some forms of bank
deregulation (e.g., decreased controls on interstate banking) generated new
competition that advantaged (at least in the short term) the general public;
(3) the economy was humming, thus increasing public confidence in free-
market forces; (4) new competitive pressures were being placed on banks
(particularly through the availability of money market accounts, competition
from foreign banks, and the increased accessibility and liquidity of the capital
markets);117 and (5) the growth of political power of large business institu-
tions, including bank holding companies, created new opportunities for the
exertion of pressure on lawmakers to go along with anti-regulatory demands.
The New Deal social contract proved to be outdated for the demands,
speed, size, and complexity of modern finance.  Slowly, banks and policymak-
ers chipped away at the walls erected during the New Deal in the name of
safety.  This led first to regulators becoming more concerned with bank prof-
itability than bank safety—a byproduct of the size and complexity of new
financial institutions, and second, the changes led to an erosion of parts of
the New Deal social contract.
116 FDIC, MANDATE FOR CHANGE: RESTRUCTURING THE BANKING INDUSTRY 7–13 (1987)
[hereinafter FDIC, MANDATE FOR CHANGE]; C. Todd Conover, Interstate Banking: Bring
Down the Walls, 4 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 115, 117 (1985) (“[T]here is not a single service or
product line today that is offered exclusively by commercial banks.”); Daniel R. Fischel et
al., The Regulation of Banks and Bank Holding Companies, 73 VA. L. REV. 301, 304 (1987)
(“[B]anks now face formidable competition in virtually every product or service they
offer.”); Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Statement Before the Subcommit-
tee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the Committee on Banking and
Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 13, 1997), in 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 249,
249 (1997) (“[T]echnology already has resulted in a blurring of product and service-defin-
ing lines so dramatic as to make many financial products virtually indistinguishable from
each other and the old rules inapplicable.”); Congressman James A. Leach, Keynote Address
at the Fordham Journal of Corporate and Financial Law Symposium: The Future of Law and Finan-
cial Services, 6 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 9, 11 (2001) (“Customers came to prefer and use
new and more sophisticated products that, particularly in the banking industry, made
many traditional banks irrelevant . . . .  Banking was truly on a trend that might be
described as ‘in eclipse,’ but even this is an understatement.”).
117 GROSSMAN, supra note 22, at 260–62 (explaining the process of disintermediation
that occurred during this time due to the interest rate caps on bank accounts and inflation
and high interest from other sources).
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1. Safety and Soundness v. Profitability
During this era of both growth and transformation in finance, banks
needed to adapt in order to survive and remain profitable.  Their safe lend-
ing and borrowing business could not keep them afloat anymore without
more freedom to take risks and expand.  Concerns about banks’ waning prof-
itability led to growing pressure to deregulate banks and allow them to com-
pete more freely with other institutions.118  The prevailing feeling was that
banks could not effectively compete against these new products because reg-
ulations were holding them back.119  In response, Congress passed seven acts
over the span of two decades which together effectively deregulated the
banking industry.120  Among other things, these acts deregulated deposit
interest rates, dismantled geographic restraints on bank expansion, repealed
Glass-Steagall barriers between banking and securities activities, and allowed
the formation of large financial institutions.121  The slow demise of the Glass-
Steagall Act brought with it more powerful and profitable banks.122  But that
was the point.  Regulators were admittedly trying to do anything in their
power to make banks profitable again, even if it meant allowing concentra-
118 Fischel et al., supra note 116, at 304 (“[I]ncreased competition has substantially
eroded, if not obliterated altogether, the effectiveness of much banking regulation.”);
Helen A. Garten, Regulatory Growing Pains: A Perspective on Bank Regulation in a Deregulatory
Age, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 501, 505–06 (1989) (“The need to find new profit sources has
been the most significant force behind deregulation of the banking industry.”).  The push
for banking deregulation came from many directions, including the federal government,
regulators, the banking industry, consumers, and scholars. KERRY COOPER & DONALD R.
FRASER, BANKING DEREGULATION AND THE NEW COMPETITION IN FINANCIAL SERVICES 17–19
(1984); Garten, supra, at 502.
119 See, e.g., FDIC, MANDATE FOR CHANGE, supra note 116, at 13 (“If banking companies
are to maintain the earnings potential fundamental to their continued viability, they must
have the opportunity to offer the products and services necessary to compete on even
terms with their new competitors.”); Garten, supra note 118, at 507, 525 (noting that
“many of the traditional tenets of bank regulation . . . have hindered banks in competing”
and remarking that “[b]y imposing restrictions on the products and services that banks
could offer . . . traditional regulation kept banks from competing with these new
entrants”); Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Statement Before the Committee
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate (Dec. 1, 1987), in 74 Fed. Res. Bull.
91, 94 (1988) (noting that the competitiveness of banks has been reduced).
120 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat.
1338 (1999); Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338; Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236; Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183; Competitive Equality Banking
Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552; Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act
of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469; Depository Institutions Deregulation and Mone-
tary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132; see also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr.,
The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975–2000: Competition, Consolida-
tion, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215 (explaining the shifts in banking during
this time).
121 CARNELL ET AL., supra note 58, at 24.
122 See id. at 27.
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tions of power or conglomeration.123  As long as the venture was profitable, it
was viewed as a positive as far as the regulators were concerned.124
This deregulation reflected an underlying shift in thinking about banks.
Safety and soundness concerns were relegated behind profitability.125  This
shift occurred partly because the regulatory tools of the past (interest rate
caps and activity restrictions) aimed at ensuring bank safety were no longer
warranted.  Due to disintermediation,126 banks were rapidly losing market
share and these restrictions exacerbated them.  The regulators had to adjust
their strategy to help banks remain safe and profitable.  However, during this
adjustment, the regulatory philosophy also changed such that along with lift-
ing onerous and outdated restrictions, regulators also abandoned previous
banking policy goals, such as avoiding concentrations of power.127  In addi-
tion, the shifting focus to bank profitability allowed risky behavior that was
profitable in the short term, but systemically destabilizing in the long
term.128  Perhaps most importantly, regulators fought the idea that banks
were “special” in the way that they had been in the past.129
123 Id.
124 HOFFMAN, supra note 27, at 241;  Saule T. Omarova, The Quiet Metamorphosis: How
Derivatives Changed the “Business of Banking,” 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1041, 1090 (2009); Inter-
pretive Letter No. 1101 from Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Authority of a
National Bank to Engage in Financial Intermediation Transaction (July 7, 2008), available
at http://www.occ.gov/static/interpretations-and-precedents/jul08/int1101.pdf.
125 See Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 97, at 402 (stating that “deregulation will leave
banking more competitive”); Garten, supra note 118, at 541 (analogizing the shift of bank-
ing regulatory strategy to the different perspectives of corporate debt holders and equity
holders—the debt holder/old banking regulation is more concerned with safety and
soundness while the equity holder/new regulation is more concerned with profitability);
Anthony Saunders, Bank Holding Companies: Structure, Performance, and Reform, in RESTRUC-
TURING BANKING AND FINANCIAL SERVICES IN AMERICA 156, 172 (William S. Haraf & Rose
Marie Kushmeider eds., 1988) (explaining the benefits to profitability in model of activity
diversification).  For a comprehensive analysis of how the OCC supplanted safety and
soundness concerns for profitability in allowing risky derivative transactions, see generally
Omarova, supra note 124.
126 Disintermediation describes the elimination of financial intermediaries, such as
banks, resulting from high inflation rates and stagnant interest offered by banks (due to
regulatory caps).  Depositors can get better returns by investing in mutual funds or securi-
ties and thus banks lose customers and revenue. See GROSSMAN, supra note 22, at 260–62.
127 See FDIC, MANDATE FOR CHANGE, supra note 116, at 37–42.  Undoubtedly, increased
geographic expansion and relaxed limits on bank mergers would cause conglomeration.
Yet these moves were encouraged by regulators in order to allow banks to compete. See
Wilmarth, supra note 120, at 241.
128 Wilmarth, supra note 120, at 240–42.
129 For the original debate on the “specialness” of banking, compare E. Gerald Corri-
gan, Are Banks Special?, 1982 FED. RES. BANK MINNEAPOLIS ANN. REP., available at http://
www.minneapolisfed.org/pubs/ar/ar1982a.cfm (answering in the affirmative), with Rich-
ard C. Aspinwall, On the “Specialness” of Banking, 7 ISSUES IN BANK. REG. 16 (1983) (arguing
that banks are not special).  Though remnants of the debate still remain, the view that
banks are not special largely won out.  Eric J. Gouvin, Of Hungry Wolves and Horizontal
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To be clear, deregulation was not viewed as supplanting or abrogating
safety and soundness concerns.  Quite the opposite, regulators felt that in
order to protect bank safety, they needed to assure their profitability.130  In
fact, profitability became of such paramount concern that many today view
safety and soundness as synonymous with profitability.131  Profitability is nec-
essary to a safe banking system, but it is not sufficient.  For example, profit-
ability was not the measure of safety and soundness in the previous half
century.  Rather, safety was defined by reference to vulnerability or exposure
to excessive risk.132  During deregulation, bank profitability became a proxy
for safety and soundness.133  Therefore, bank regulators shed regulations
that threatened profitability.134  The Office of the Comptroller (OCC) for
example, through interpretive letters, allowed banks to engage in highly risky
derivatives transactions without examining the risks involved by instead
emphasizing the potential profits of the venture.135  However, these “profita-
ble” transactions were laden with risks and have since exposed many banking
institutions to heightened vulnerability.136  The sheer size of the derivatives
market is also staggering as the industry now dwarfs the size of the nation’s
capital markets and GDP.137  Regulators saved banking by allowing banks to
become profitable and compete with nonbanks, but the focus on profitability
did not shift once it became apparent that profitability is not always synony-
mous with safety.
For example, during the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s and 1990s,
regulators continued to deregulate the industry with the hope that if troub-
led savings and loan associations (S&Ls) could engage in more expansive
and riskier activities, they could regain profitability and recover their
losses.138  The strategy, termed “gambling for resurrection,”139 was indicative
of the regulatory philosophy of the time.  Many blamed the industry’s lack of
Conflicts: Rethinking the Justifications for Bank Holding Company Liability, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV.
949, 961.
130 Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 90
(2008).
131 Id. (“[Banking] agencies are designed with a primary mission to protect the safety
and soundness of the banking system.  This means protecting banks’ profitability.”).
132 See Garten, supra note 118, at 541.
133 Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 130, at 90.
134 See Omarova, supra note 124, at 1080–82 (discussing the OCC’s expansion of regula-
tions authorizing securities and other high-risk investment strategies without analyzing any
of the risks).
135 Id. at 1090.
136 Id. (“[T]he agency’s interpretation failed to mention the other side of the inevitable
trade-off: increasing U.S. banks’ vulnerability to such distant shocks as sudden changes in
the value of non-U.S. real estate or natural disasters in remote corners of the planet under-
going a major climate change.”).
137 It’s a (Not So) Small World, After All, EQUITAS CAPITAL ADVISORS, LLC, http://www.
equitas-capital.com/2012/research/its-a-not-so-small-world-after-all/ (last visited Nov. 30,
2013).
138 See GROSSMAN, supra note 22, at 269 (noting the history and developments leading
up to the S&L crisis, and the response “by both state and federal governments . . . [of]
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profitability on onerous regulation and advocated deregulation so that S&Ls
could compete with other market entities on an even playing field.140  It was
thought that regulations were impeding profitability and that their safety
could only be achieved through competition.141  This did not come to pass.
Instead, deregulation caused many of the most unscrupulous characters in
the financial world to flock to S&L ownership and use them as private piggy
banks insured by the government.142  The eventual colossal failure of the
industry cost the government upwards of $132 billion of taxpayer funds
alone.143
2. Erosion of the Social Contract
In addition to conflating profitability with safety and soundness, con-
cerns about consumer protection and access to credit were also compro-
mised during this era.  For example, the OCC and the Office of Thrift
Supervision (OTS) announced comprehensive preemption to protect all
national banks and thrifts from state consumer protection laws.  The ratio-
nale was that these public-protecting laws rendered banks less efficient and
profitable by limiting the kinds and amounts of loans that these banks could
make.144  Access to credit was also diminished during this era as community
banks, thrifts, and credit unions were forced to compete with the large bank-
broaden[ing] the power of savings and loans, in the hope that S&Ls could earn their way
out of trouble”).
139 Id. at 270 (citing James R. Barth et al., Moral Hazard and the Thrift Crisis: An Analysis
of 1988 Resolutions (Washington: Off. Pol’y & Econ. Res., Fed. Home Loan Bank Board,
FHLBB Research Paper No. 160 (1989))).
140 Fred E. Case, Deregulation: Invitation to Disaster in the S&L Industry, 59 FORDHAM L.
REV. S93, S104–05 (1991) (“The FHLBB did little to enlighten the debates over deregula-
tion because it quickly chose to advocate deregulation under the influence of its politically
appointed chairmen. . . . [T]he deregulation concept was adopted first and most enthusias-
tically by FHLBB Chairman Preston Market, and was promoted in varying degrees by suc-
ceeding chairmen.”).
141 See id. at S96 (noting the FHLBB’s position that “[we] see less need for regulation
because there will be more market discipline” and “[t]he most important economic factor
affecting mergers in the 1980s will be increased competition”).
142 1 FDIC, supra note 89, at 173, 178–79.
143 Id. at 187.
144 DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM 2, 7 (2009), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf; Interpretive Letter
No. 999 from John D. Hawke, Jr., Comptroller of the Currency, to Barney Frank, Ranking
Member, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives 1–2 (Aug.
2004), available at http://www.occ.gov/static/interpretations-and-precedents/aug04/
int999.pdf; see also Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, 5 DEMOCRACY J. 14–16 (2007),
available at http://www.democracyjournal.org/pdf/5/Warren.pdf (discussing the inability
to pass legislation during this time that would protect consumers and noting that the
“main mission” of the OCC and OTS is to “protect the financial stability of banks and other
institutions, not to protect consumers”).
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ing sector.145  These banks either closed or changed their public-serving mis-
sion during this time, withdrawing from underserved communities in search
of higher profits.146
Ultimately, this period of deregulation resulted in an asymmetrical ero-
sion of the social contract with banks.  The revisions abrogated many of the
safety and soundness regulations and public-serving obligations imposed on
banks, but did not take away the government safety net, such as FDIC insur-
ance and access to the Federal Reserve discount window.  To be fair, many
bankers and supporters of deregulation advocated for a complete market
model and an imposition of market discipline without any government sup-
port.147  However, policymakers, wary of the bank failures so common prior
to FDIC insurance, continued to support government insurance.148  Thus, a
lopsided arrangement was forged between banks and the state and continued
until it was fully tested in 2008.
To maintain profitability, several bedrock principles of banking policy
were sidelined.  First, the principle of avoiding concentrations of power was
abandoned, despite its centrality to Jefferson’s and Brandeis’s fears149 and its
recognition as a guiding principle of several acts of banking legislation.150
Geographic expansion and bank mergers were encouraged by regulators to
allow banks to compete with non-banks.  Second, the separation of banking
and commerce was also partially repealed.151  Strict separation of commerce
and banking within the banking structure gave way to more “competitive”
and “efficient” structures that increased complexity and opacity in banking.
145 See CASKEY, supra note 103, at 8 (discussing the effect of deregulation on traditional
banks in increasing pressure on them to pay higher interest rates and shut down access to
traditional banking services); Case, supra note 140, at S97 (noting that “deregulation was a
disaster for the traditional S&Ls” as it forced them to perform their “traditional S&L func-
tions” in an environment that forced more high-risk investments and returns).
146 CASKEY, supra note 103, at 8, 90–91; Baradaran, supra note 91, at 486–87.
147 Arthur J. Rolnick, Too Big to Fail: Market Discipline as a Regulator of Bank Risk, FED.
RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, available at http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_
papers/studies/tbtf/market.cfm? (last visited Nov. 4, 2013).
148 Id.
149 See Hills, supra note 40, at 11, 23, 31 (noting Jefferson’s and Brandeis’s suspicions of
banking power).
150 One purpose of both the Bank Holding Company Act and the Glass-Steagall Act was
to avoid concentrations of power.  Carol Conjura, Independent Bankers Association v.
Conover: Nonbank Banks Are Not in the Business of Banking, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 429, 429 n.1
(1986) (“Congress’ primary purpose in enacting the BHCA was to . . . prevent concen-
trated control over commercial bank credit.” (citations omitted)); Saule T. Omarova &
Margaret E. Tahyar, That Which We Call a Bank: Revisiting the History of Bank Holding Com-
pany Regulation in the United States, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 113, 132 (2011) (noting the
pre-Bank Holding Company Act lobbying groups that asserted that central collections of
economic power were dangerous).
151 Mehrsa Baradaran, Reconsidering the Separation of Banking and Commerce, 80 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 385, 427–28 (2012); Omarova, supra note 124, at 1094; Arthur E. Wilmarth,
Jr., Wal-Mart and the Separation of Banking and Commerce, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1539, 1550, 1569
(2007).
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Slowly, the “Thou Shalt Not’s” of Glass-Steagall were replaced with a more
fluid system that depended on firms’ internal models of risk weighing.152
Regulation in this area became increasingly complex, but the strong drift was
in the direction of more flexibility and discretion in enforcing standards.153
The results of these reforms set the stage for calamity.  For several
decades, banks became very profitable and the financial world grew exponen-
tially as barriers were removed.154  Even so, bank failures started to occur
much more commonly during the deregulatory era.  Empirical researchers
have found that “the probability of a banking crisis occurring was similar dur-
ing 1880–1913 and 1973–97 . . . and essentially zero during 1945–71.”155
Then came the financial crisis of 2008.  This crisis was the culmination of two
decades of bank deregulation.  But the response to the crisis was not the
response that would match the deregulatory philosophy.  Instead of allowing
the market to enforce its discipline and allow banks to fail, as was dictated by
the repudiation of the social contract, the government stepped in and bailed
out the banking industry.
***
The 1980s brought, in effect, an abandonment of both the conceptual
vision of banks as inextricably bound to the state and the practical emphasis
on steady and conservative (and thus public-protecting) approaches to bank-
ing regulation that took hold after the Great Depression.156  During this
152 Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir., Fin. Stability, Bank of Eng., & Vasileios Madouros,
Economist, Bank of Eng., Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s 36th Eco-
nomic Policy Symposium: The Dog and the Frisbee 18 (Aug. 31, 2012), available at http://
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2012/speech596.pdf.
153 See id. at 7 (explaining the growing complexity of banking regulation); Mark S.
Weisman & Ann M. Dougherty, Banks and Bank Holding Companies: Going for Brokerage Under
Glass-Steagall, 4 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 315, 320 (1985) (“[New securities instruments] chal-
lenged the regulators to exceed the bounds of historical definitions that were previously
used to determine the scope of Glass-Steagall’s prohibitions so that banks would be able to
keep pace with competition in an evolving marketplace.  Although the language and legis-
lative history of Glass-Steagall both demonstrate that Congress intended to leave little dis-
cretion to regulators, recent interpretations by the OCC and Board have attempted to limit
the original scope of these prohibitions.” (footnotes omitted)).  The authors further
explain the functional and contextual approaches to regulation developed in the 1980s.
“This approach, however, ‘invites an individualized definitional process under the Act and
endorses, de facto, a substantial degree of administrative agency discretion to apply the Act
on the basis of changed situations and evolving circumstances.’” Id. at 323 (quoting Har-
vey L. Pitt & Julie L. Williams, The Glass-Steagall Act: Key Issues for the Financial Services Indus-
try, 11 SEC. REG. L.J. 234, 259 (1983)).
154 See Garten, supra note 118, at 521 (noting that the banking industry was highly
profitable for a long time under the “regime of traditional regulation”).
155 GROSSMAN, supra note 22, at 266 (citing Michael Bordo et al., Is the Crisis Problem
Growing More Severe?, 32 ECON. POL’Y 53–82 (2001)).
156 For a thorough account of the changes that occurred during the deregulatory era
including conglomeration, increased risk, and reduced regulatory oversight, see Wilmarth,
supra note 120.
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timeframe, which spanned the mid-1970s until the crisis of 2008, bankers
were agitated to be relieved of certain aspects of the social contract.157  Banks
asked to be freed from onerous government restrictions.158  They sought to
be treated more like ordinary corporations and less like public utilities.159
They got what they wanted for the most part as many century-old restrictions
on operations were abandoned.160  At best, deregulation brought mixed, and
some would say, disastrous results.161  Banks started to fail in high pre-
Depression numbers.162
The bank deregulation that took hold in the 1980s was not just an exper-
iment in the ongoing effort to find the right balance of government involve-
ment in private markets as conditions change over time.  Rather, it reflected
a foundational shift from both the conceptual and the practical understand-
ing of banking that has run through our nation’s history.  To be sure, this
program of deregulation might have been driven by a public-regarding effort
to help society as a whole by increasing bank competitiveness, fostering the
development of new bank products, generating expanded capital formation,
and increasing economic efficiency.  But in all of this, policymakers lost their
way because they lost sight of the special social contract that must exist with
banks.
The above history makes the case that there has been a social contract
between the government and the banks.  This arrangement has evolved with
the needs of the nation as well as the economy.  The basic outline of the
157 See supra subsection I.C.2.
158 See GROSSMAN, supra note 22, at 266 (noting the “liberating experience” for banks of
being freed from the heavier regulation of previous decades).
159 See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
160 See Patricia A. McCoy et al., Systemic Risk Through Securitization: The Result of Deregula-
tion and Regulatory Failure, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1327, 1333–35 (2009) (discussing the various
pieces of legislation passed in the 1980s that served to undo long-standing regulations
against risky loan features and investments).
161 Id. at 1329 (explaining that the secondary markets existed since the 1980s but that it
was the deregulation and the lax enforcement of the remaining regulations that caused the
financial crisis); see also Anthony Faiola et al., What Went Wrong, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2008,
at A1 (arguing that financial regulators’ lack of sufficient oversight and deregulatory poli-
cies contributed to the financial collapse); Peter S. Goodman, Taking Hard New Look at a
Greenspan Legacy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2008, at A1 (discussing the possibility that the financial
crisis could have been avoided if Alan Greenspan had exercised more oversight of certain
firms and financial products); L. Randall Wray, Lessons from the Subprime Meltdown 53 (Levy
Econ. Inst., Working Paper No. 522, 2007) (stating that the financial crisis is a prime exam-
ple of the damage deregulation can cause).  Even Alan Greenspan, former Chairman of
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve and a former proponent of deregulation,
has admitted that some of the assumptions of deregulation may have been flawed. See Alan
Greenspan, We Will Never Have a Perfect Model of Risk, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 17, 2008,
at 13.
162 “[T]he probability of a banking crisis occurring was similar during 1880–1913 and
1973–97, approximately double this rate during the turbulent interwar period of 1919–39,
and essentially zero during 1945–71.” GROSSMAN, supra note 22, at 266 (citing Bordo et al.,
supra note 155, at 53–82).
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social contract has been that in exchange for protection from the state, banks
would provide economic services to meet certain public needs and be subject
to restraints.  Below, the Article will explore the present day social contract.
First, I will define why such a social contract does and should exist today—
why banks and the government still need each other.  Second, I will make the
case that the safety net that exists today was not meant to support the large
banks that currently dominate the market.  And finally, I will propose that
either the banking structure should be modified to match the safety net pro-
vided or a new social contract should be forged—one that recognizes safety
and soundness, consumer protection, and access to credit as its principal
tenets.
II. DEFINING THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
This Part provides the justification for enforcing a social contract
between banks and the state.  The state needs banks to perform specific func-
tions that enable trade and commerce.  Banks, in turn, need both govern-
ment recognition and a safety net to gain consumer trust.  The government
safety net involves a permanent system that provides insurance and liquidity
for banks to enable them to withstand economic stress and customer runs.
This part of the safety net has operated without much controversy since the
Great Depression.
The second part of the government safety net is a more recent phenom-
enon and involves discretionary emergency bailouts.163  Though new,
bailouts are likely to continue because their primary recipients are the largest
U.S. banks that control the majority of banking assets and whose failures
would cause many problems.  Their status as likely bailout recipients is
demonstrated in their epithet, “Too Big To Fail” (TBTF).  This Part makes
the claim that the full government safety net needs to be accounted for in
constructing a social contract suited for the modern banking world.
A. The State Needs Banks
Basic economics explains why the government needs a well-functioning
banking sector.  Adam Smith, in Wealth of Nations, declares: “It is not by aug-
menting the capital of the country, but by rendering a greater part of that
capital active and productive than would otherwise be so, that the most judi-
cious operations of banking can increase the industry of the country.”164
Joseph Schumpeter posits that “[the banker] stands between those who wish
163 See Gretchen Morgenson, One Safety Net that Needs to Shrink, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2012,
at BU1 (noting that Dodd-Frank “widened the federal safety net” by providing several
clearinghouses with the authority to access the Federal Reserve’s fund in a period of crisis);
Review & Outlook, Harry’s Bank Bailout, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2012, at A18 (discussing
Senator Harry Reid’s attempt to renew a 2008 emergency bailout program for banks and
their wealthiest customers).
164 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 304 (Edwin Cannan ed., The Modern
Library 1937) (1776).
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to form new combinations and the possessors of productive means.  He is
essentially a phenomenon of development . . . . [The banker is] the ephor of
the exchange economy.”165  Banks create money166 and credit167 as they
turn consumer deposits into loans.  There is even evidence that banking
activity not only enables but spurs real economic development.168
Banks facilitate efficient trade and transaction-making and enable the
flow of resources across the economy.  Banking is also the medium through
which the government, through the Federal Reserve, can implement fiscal
and monetary policy.169  Therefore, the government needs banks to have a
stable-growth economy, credit accessibility, and uniform monetary policy.170
Moreover, banks operate with heightened leverage and their failure is much
more problematic than that of other businesses because of systemic risk and
monetary supply concerns.171  Thus, the state has an interest in ensuring
against this failure—an interest that doesn’t exist for other commercial enti-
ties.  Governments protect banks because they need them to be stable.
In his 1980 and revised 2000 essays Are Banks Special?, Gerald Corrigan,
former Chairman of the Federal Reserve of New York, places banks at the
center of the economy and justifies stringent supervision of banks because of
their unique status as intermediaries.172  He proposed three characteristics
that made banks “special.”  First, they issue transaction accounts (i.e., they
hold liabilities that are payable on demand at par and that are readily trans-
165 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 74 (Redvers Opie
trans., Transaction Publishers 1983) (1934).
166 JOHN HICKS, A THEORY OF ECONOMIC HISTORY 78, 94–97 (1969).  An Ephor is “one
of five ancient Spartan magistrates having power over the king.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http:/
/www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ephor (last visited Nov. 30, 2013).
167 See HENRY THORNTON, AN ENQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND EFFECTS OF THE PAPER
CREDIT OF GREAT BRITAIN 175–76 (F.A. v. Hayek, ed., Augustus M. Kelley 1962) (1802)
(discussing credit in Great Britain).
168 GROSSMAN, supra note 22, at 7–9.
169 Y. Nancy Ni, Recent Development, The Federal Reserve’s Multi-Faceted Response to the
Credit Crisis, 27 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 240, 240 (2008).  The Federal Reserve requires
national and state-member banks to hold liquidity reserves (currency) at the Federal
Reserve.  By requiring a higher percent reserve, it can effectively destroy money circulating
in the economy, thereby limiting inflation. CARNELL ET AL., supra note 58, at 50.  The
Federal Reserve’s use of banks to create and destroy money provides monetary, and
thereby economic, stability. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE FEDERAL
RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 16 (9th ed. Dec. 1994), available at http://www.
federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/pf_2.pdf.
170 John L. Douglas, The Role of a Banking System in Nation-Building, 60 ME. L. REV. 511,
512 (2008) (stating that banks are integral to any nation and a growing economy).
171 CARNELL ET AL., supra note 58, at 43–47.
172 Corrigan, in articulating this point, was reacting to the market pressure to deregu-
late banks and was attempting to take a stand against those who claimed that banks should
be treated like corporations.  E. Gerald Corrigan, Are Banks Special?, FED. RESERVE BANK OF
MINNEAPOLIS ANN. REP. (Jan. 1982), http://www.minneapolisfed.org/pubs/ar/ar1982a.
cfm [hereinafter Corrigan, 1982]; E. Gerald Corrigan, Are Banks Special? A Revisitation, FED.
RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS (Mar. 1, 2000), http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publica-
tions_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=3527 [hereinafter Corrigan, 2000].
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ferable to third parties).173  Second, they are the backup source of liquidity
for all other institutions, financial and nonfinancial.174  Third, they are the
transmission belt for monetary policy.175  As Corrigan points out, the func-
tions of a bank are too important for banks to be regulated like other market
entities.176  In his essays, Corrigan states that “the presence of the public
safety net uniquely available to a particular class of institutions also implies
that those institutions have unique public responsibilities and may therefore be
subject to implicit codes of conduct or explicit regulations that do not fall on
other institutions.”177
B. Banks Need Governmental Support
Banks invest in long-term, illiquid assets (i.e., loans) and pay for these
assets using short-term liabilities (i.e., deposits).178  Banks provide businesses
and individuals with production-driving liquidity by investing in their illiquid
assets.179  This structure exposes banks to runs.180  Banks rely on the statisti-
cal probability that not all depositors will seek to reclaim their funds at one
time.181  But public fears of bank insolvency can sometimes erode depositor
trust, causing runs and potentially a bank’s bankruptcy.182  Banks have used
various tactics throughout their history to appear trustworthy to their custom-
ers who need to be induced to place their hard-earned money in a bank’s
care.  Early banks would display their specie, i.e. gold, for all to see or open
the vault door to reveal their piles of currency or build marble buildings and
gold safes to give the appearance of unlimited funds.183  Some art history
literature suggests that many banks are made to look like Greek temples to
create the appearance that they have always been and always will be.184  For
173 Corrigan, 1982, supra note 172; Corrigan, 2000, supra note 172.
174 Corrigan, 1982, supra note 172; Corrigan, 2000, supra note 172.
175 Corrigan, 1982, supra note 172; Corrigan, 2000, supra note 172.
176 Corrigan, 1982, supra note 172; Corrigan, 2000, supra note 172.
177 Corrigan, 1982, supra note 172 (emphasis added).
178 See Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, Banks, Short-Term Debt and Financial
Crises: Theory, Policy Implications and Applications, 54 CARNEGIE-ROCHESTER CONF. SERIES ON
PUB. POL’Y 37, 40 (2001), available at http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/douglas.diamond/
research/papers/bankshortterm.pdf (discussing the “peculiar institutional structure” of
banks in which illiquid assets are financed by volatile, short-term liabilities).
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 See Vincent Di Lorenzo, Public Confidence and the Banking System: The Policy Basis for
Continued Separation of Commercial and Investment Banking, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 647, 670 (1986)
(noting the often-fragile inverse relationship between public confidence and deposit
flow—the lower the confidence, the more destabilizing or ruinous to the bank as its liquid-
ity is destroyed).
182 See id. at 648 (“A failure of public confidence leads to a hemorrhaging of deposits,
which may fulfill a self-dooming prophesy that can paralyze the institution.”).
183 See NIALL FERGUSON, THE ASCENT OF MONEY 27–31 (2008).
184 Jeffrey Sklansky, “A Bank on Parnassus”: Nicholas Biddle and the Beauty of Banking, 6
COMMON-PLACE (Apr. 2006), http://www.common-place.org/vol-06/no-03/sklansky/.
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many years after the Great Depression, banks discouraged their employees
from working at night lest the public perceive trouble at a bank.185  Bankers
understood that bank runs were not a result of actual insolvency, but the
result of fear, perceived insolvency, or even another bank’s failure.186  Even
the safest bank could experience a run if the public’s confidence faltered.187
Therefore, public perception of the safety of banks is the linchpin to a suc-
cessful banking sector.188
How does the banking system secure public confidence?  Through gov-
ernment sponsorship and financial support.  The currency of banks is trust.
The monetary system falls apart when trust is lacking.189  Diminished trust in
the banking system and in the ability of banks to honor contracts and credit
agreement leads to diminished lending and catastrophic financial conse-
quences.190  An important element of the public’s trust in the banking sys-
tem derives from the public’s knowledge that banking is heavily regulated
and overseen by the government.  People trust banks because they know that
the government watches over them closely—for example, that the FDIC
inspects banks and enforces regulations.  In addition, the government pro-
vides a safety net to struggling banks.191  This is the primary reason that the
government bailed out the banking system: to restore trust in the nation’s
banks.
The government uses several methods to instill public trust in the bank-
ing sector.  Some are day-to-day measures, such as oversight and deposit
insurance, and some are emergency measures used during times of systemic
failure.  The various components of the standard and emergency safety net
for banks are outlined below.  They include deposit insurance, Federal
Reserve liquidity support, and bailouts.
1. Deposit Insurance
Perhaps the most direct way banks have garnered consumer trust is
through government guarantees.  Deposit insurance started in the U.S. on
the state level in 1829,192 but it wasn’t until the Great Depression that the
185 CARNELL ET AL., supra note 58, at 46.
186 Id.
187 Id.; Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 97, at 402.
188 See Di Lorenzo, supra note 181, at 667 (“The viability of banking institutions
depends not only on long-term profitability, but on public perception of profitability and
safety.”).
189 See id. at 685, 698 (stating that the “decline of general public trust and confidence
in the banking system” may have a “disruptive effect . . . on the safety and soundness of the
banking system”).
190 See id. at 648 (discussing that a “failure of public confidence” can lead to disastrous
liquidity problems for banks and affect their ability to honor deposits and meet the credit
needs of individuals and businesses).
191 HEIDI MANDANIS SCHOONER & MICHAEL W. TAYLOR, GLOBAL BANK REGULATION
51–71 (2010).
192 GROSSMAN, supra note 22, at 104 (citing Charles W. Calomiris, Deposit Insurance: Les-
sons from the Record, 13 ECON. PERSP., FED. RES. BANK CHI. 10, 10–30 (May 1989)); see also
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federal government, through the FDIC, began to insure bank deposits
against losses.193  Deposit insurance immediately reduced bank runs without
interfering with the banks’ asset liability structure.194  By removing deposi-
tors’ fears of loss, deposit insurance effectively eliminates any incentive they
might have to withdraw their funds before they are needed.195  Moreover,
deposit insurance reduces systemic risk caused by a lack of confidence in the
entire banking industry during times of economic distress.196
Federal insurance has also been more effective than either state or pri-
vate deposit insurance.  Private insurance schemes have not been attempted
on a large scale and have not been successfully implemented on a small
scale.197  Economists Diamond and Dybvig, in their seminal work on deposit
insurance, conclude that deposit insurance is best administered by the gov-
ernment and that “competitive markets cannot provide this liquidity insur-
ance”198 for a variety of reasons, but especially because a “private insurance
company is constrained by its reserves in the scale of unconditional guaran-
tees which it can offer.”199  State insurance funds have also been unsuccess-
ful.  Several states have tried to implement deposit insurance systems, but
none were able to survive a systemic crisis.200  The FDIC has an advantage
over state schemes because of its larger size and its ability to access liquidity
through the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve.201
HOWARD BODENHORN, STATE BANKING IN EARLY AMERICA (2003); Charles W. Calomiris, Is
Deposit Insurance Necessary? A Historical Perspective, 50 J. ECON. HIST. 283, 283–95 (1990).
193 Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 97, at 401, 413.
194 Id. at 404 (stating that “[d]eposit insurance is shown to be able to rule out runs
without reducing the ability of banks to transform assets”).
195 See id. at 415 (indicating that government deposit insurance eliminates bank runs by
removing the perceived need to participate in a bank run); Cynthia Crawford Lichtenstein,
Defining Our Terms Carefully and in Context: Thoughts on Reading (and in One Case, Rereading)
Three Books, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 695, 712 (2012).
196 See Di Lorenzo, supra note 181, at 672–73 (discussing the need for deposit insur-
ance in order to stem the outflow of funds from banks and keep consumer confidence
from eroding); see also Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 97, at 404 (noting that deposit insur-
ance helps stop runs).
197 Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 97, at 413, 416; Michael Quint, About 10% of Credit
Unions Are Privately Insured, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1991, at D4. See generally JANET LUNDY &
BENJAMIN D. FINDER, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND., COST SHARING FOR HEALTH CARE:
FRANCE, GERMANY, AND SWITZERLAND 1–20 (2009) (discussing the methods by which
France, Germany, and Switzerland limit cost-sharing burdens on their citizens and sug-
gesting the application of these principles in the United States).
198 Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 97, at 403.
199 Id. at 413.
200 CARNELL ET AL., supra note 58, at 18; see also GROSSMAN, supra note 22, at 104–05,
240–41 (explaining that although several states set up deposit insurance schemes in the
1800s and early 1900s, “[e]ach ran into difficulty with the decline in agricultural prices in
the 1920s, and either collapsed or became inoperative”).
201 Laura Bruce, How the FDIC Pays for Bank Failures, BANKRATE (Oct. 16, 2008), http://
www.bankrate.com/finance/savings/how-the-fdic-pays-for-bank-failures-1.aspx (discussing
the FDIC’s authority to borrow from the Treasury Department in the event the FDIC fund
goes negative).
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It is of course possible to have a banking system that does not rely on
deposit insurance—one that is closer to a free market ideal.  Even today,
some industry observers continue to denounce deposit insurance.202  These
free-market advocates would like to see the momentum of the deregulatory
era accelerated and fully actualized.  Removing deposit insurance, they claim,
reduces moral hazard because it allows for market discipline.203  Removing
government support from the banking system would certainly eliminate the
moral hazard issues and possibly reduce some of the inefficiencies in banking
that excess regulation has caused.  But this arrangement would be a reversal
of a century-old banking framework.  It would be a new relationship alto-
gether—similar to the one that corporations generally have with the state.
Corporations are taxed and regulated to prevent harm to consumers, but not
protected by the state in the same way as banks.  This is not to say that such
an arrangement could not be attempted again and perfected, but it would be
a marked departure from the banking policy of this country.  Most observers
agree, moreover, that deposit insurance is the best way to keep the banking
sector stable and reliable.204  Indeed, every developed country has a deposit
insurance scheme in place.205
And while this Article makes the case for a renewed and well-defined
social contract, some have suggested that in the case of deposit insurance,
ambiguity of the terms of the contract is preferable.206  For example, a fire
insurer will require the insured home to install smoke detectors in order to
minimize moral hazard.207  But in the absence of a working smoke detector,
moral hazard could also be significantly reduced if a homeowner were not
certain that the insurer would compensate for losses if the house were
destroyed.  Historically, the relationship between the bank and its insurer has
not been clearly defined, with some contending that this “constructive ambi-
guity” in which “a rescue is by no means certain, can help alleviate moral
hazard.”208  This argument certainly justifies ambiguity of terms for small and
202 John A. Allison, The Cure for the Banking Industry, Part II: More Private Capital, Less
Public Risk, AM. BANKER (Sept. 25, 2012, 8:00 AM), http://www.americanbanker.com/bank
think/cure-for-banking-industry-part-two-more-private-capital-less-public-risk-1052773-1.
html.
203 Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 209 (2008).
204 Ash Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt & Enrica Detragiache, Does Deposit Insurance Increase Banking
System Stability?: An Empirical Investigation 26 (revised Apr. 2000), available at http://site
resources.worldbank.org/INTFR/Resources/475459-1108066643741/asli_enrica.pdf
(“[T]he impact of deposit insurance on bank stability tends to be stronger the more exten-
sive is [sic] the coverage offered to depositors, where the scheme is funded, and where the
scheme is run by the government rather than by the private sector.”).
205 See Haldane & Alessandri, supra note 97, at 4 (discussing the “steady rise” in the
number of countries with deposit insurance since the 1960s).
206 See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Deposit Insurance, the Implicit Regulatory
Contract, and the Mismatch in the Term Structure of Banks’ Assets and Liabilities, 12 YALE J. ON
REG. 1, 22 (1995) (describing the theory that “constructive ambiguity” can reduce perverse
incentives created by regulation).
207 GROSSMAN, supra note 22, at 85.
208 Id.
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mid-sized banks that go through the FDIC resolution process and are not
assured survival.  In other words, many small and mid-sized banks have been
allowed to “burn.”  However, as I demonstrate below, failures of large banks
have not been as prevalent.  Indeed, bailouts of large firms are increasingly
understood to be inevitable, which makes it very difficult to reduce moral
hazard by relying on uncertainty.  Therefore, a better approach with these
large banks for which moral hazard runs high is to be clear on what their
obligations are—it is better to install working smoke detectors because the
rescue is likely and expensive.
2. Federal Reserve Liquidity Support
Struggling banks are also given government support in their day-to-day
operations.  The Federal Reserve provides favorable term rates to banks in
distress to alleviate their temporary liquidity problems.209  The Federal
Reserve can provide this support to banks by providing an antidote to bank
runs through its discount window.210  To meet the needs of its creditors, a
bank would otherwise have to sell its illiquid assets at a substantial discount,
or a “fire sale,” often accelerating a bank’s decline.  The discount window can
prevent this slide into insolvency by providing liquidity as a lender of last
resort.211  Instead of the bank selling its assets at liquidation prices, it can
borrow from the Federal Reserve discount window and present its assets (sub-
ject to Federal Reserve approval) as collateral, usually at a “haircut.”212
Therefore, the Federal Reserve can provide otherwise unavailable capital
assistance in times of systemic stress, thus effectively subsidizing the banking
sector.213  When other corporations experience financial distress or failure,
they also need credit and they often get it through Chapter 11 or other bank-
ruptcy restructuring.  However, the credit they receive is given at a higher
209 The Federal Reserve discount window gives loans to banks that are secured by collat-
eral, such as government securities or other high-quality debt.  The Fed also discounts
eligible paper at low rates approved by the Fed. See FED. RESERVE SYS., Alternative Instru-
ments for Open Market and Discount Window Operations 3-29 to 3-33 (Dec. 2002), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/surveys/soma/alt_instrmnts.pdf.
210 “The Discount Window is the long-standing program through which the twelve Fed-
eral Reserve Banks make short-term loans (often overnight) to depository institutions, and
it can serve as ‘an emergency, back-up source of liquidity’ for borrowing depository institu-
tions that lack other options.”  Bloomberg, L.P. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., 601 F.3d 143, 145 n.1 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 97, at 417
(describing the discount window and its role as a lender of last resort).
211 Haldane & Alessandri, supra note 97, at 3.
212 A “haircut” is a discount applied informally to the market value of a firm’s collateral
in order to account for the risks of the loan. The Federal Reserve Discount Window, FED.
RESERVE DISCOUNT WINDOW, http://www.frbdiscountwindow.org/discountwindowbook.
cfm?hdrID=14&dtlID=43#introduction (last updated Mar. 18, 2012).
213 This support creates a significant moral hazard. See, e.g., SCHOONER & TAYLOR, supra
note 191, at 60–66 (“The moral hazard is that the insured will allow him or herself to incur
greater losses knowing that a third party is footing the bill.”); Cheryl D. Block, Measuring
the True Cost of Government Bailout, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 149, 224–25 (2010).
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than normal interest rate.  The discounted rates banks receive give them a
subsidy as compared to other firms.
In the event of industry wide strain, the Federal Reserve creates an addi-
tional safety net by providing liquidity to banks.214  This window was used
often by the largest banks during the recent crisis.  The Federal Reserve lent
upwards of $13 billion to struggling banks during this time to alleviate the
credit crunch.215
3. Bailouts
In addition to the permanent bank safety net, governments bail out
banks in times of emergency.  Some bailouts of the nation’s banks have
occurred through formal measures, such as TARP, which I address below.
But authorities can use “soft” bailout strategies as well.  In 2008, for example,
the Federal Reserve established several lending facilities pursuant to its emer-
gency statutory power under section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act.216
These programs significantly expanded the federal safety net because several
of them, including the largest, Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF), were
designed to grant nonbanks (or non-depository financial institutions) access
to the Federal Reserve’s liquidity support facilities, such as the discount win-
dow discussed above.217  These funds went directly to the largest U.S. finan-
cial institutions, now operating as Bank Holding Companies (BHCs).218
These facilities operated at a high balance of $923 billion in 2008 and 2009,
but have a current balance of $55 billion.219  In other words, one of the les-
sons of the 2008 financial crisis was that the federal safety net may, under
214 During the recent crisis, the federal discount window was opened to both banks as
well as shadow banks that needed liquidity to avoid failure. The Federal Reserve’s ‘Breathtak-
ing’ $7.7 Trillion Bank Bailout, THE WEEK (Nov. 28, 2011), http://theweek.com/article/
index/221883/the-federal-reserves-breathtaking-77-trillion-bank-bailout [hereinafter THE
WEEK].
215 Bob Ivry, Secret Fed Loans Gave Banks $13 Billion Undisclosed to Congress, BLOOMBERG
(Nov. 27, 2011, 7:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-28/secret-fed-loans-
undisclosed-to-congress-gave-banks-13-billion-in-income.html.
216 12 U.S.C. § 343(3) (2012); Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet: Other
Lending Facilities, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., http://www.federalreserve.
gov/monetarypolicy/bst_lendingother.htm (last updated June 3, 2013).  For a comprehen-
sive and detailed explanation of the various bailout approaches used by the Federal
Reserve during the aftermath of the financial crisis, see Christian A. Johnson, Exigent and
Unusual Circumstances: The Federal Reserve and the U.S. Financial Crisis 269 (Sept. 7,
2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1584731.
217 See Meena Thiruvengadam, Investment Bank Borrowing at Discount Window Hits Record,
WALL. ST. J. (Sept. 26, 2008, 12:33 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12223780661177
6365.html (discussing the opening of the discount window to bank primary dealers rather
than only more heavily regulated commercial banks for the first time since the Great
Depression).
218 Matthew Sherman, A Short History of Financial Deregulation in the United States, CENTER
FOR ECON. & POL’Y RES. 13, 15 (July 2009), available at http://www.cepr.net/documents/
publications/dereg-timeline-2009-07.pdf.
219 Johnson, supra note 216, at 290.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\89-3\NDL306.txt unknown Seq: 38 17-FEB-14 14:20
1320 notre dame law review [vol. 89:3
certain circumstances, be extended to any institution that borrows short to
lend long, especially if that institution is deemed TBTF.220
Although FDIC insurance was an effective (and arguably the most effec-
tive) measure against runs in the banking industry, it could not prevent the
most recent financial run and is no longer enough because the recent crisis
involved large financial firms “running” other financial firms.221  The impli-
cations for the social contract are clear: the state chose to preserve trust in
the banking system instead of letting these large firms fail or go through the
bankruptcy process.  And they did so because they thought they had no
choice.222  Bailouts were therefore politically and economically expedient.223
Bailouts are “an inevitable feature of modern economies [because] the inter-
connectedness of firms means that the entire economy bears the risk of an
individual firm’s failure.”224  Although the government has recently forsaken
any future bailouts, the economic realities of banking make it clear that
bailouts are sometimes a political necessity and cannot be regulated away.225
One way to address the problem of soft or discretionary but inevitable
bailouts is to force large financial institutions to pay for them ex ante.  Most
insurance funds, including the FDIC fund, work this way.  Insured entities
pay premiums for the insurance, and these premiums are adjusted based on
220 See Block, supra note 213, at 224–25 (discussing the “implicit guarantees” created by
the most recent bailouts).  The typical government safety net has historically only applied
to the traditional banking system (i.e., commercial banks), but the recent crisis was not a
crisis of commercial banks.  Instead, it was centered on the shadow banking sector, or in
other words, the largest U.S. banks, which are now BHCs. See Gary Gorton, Slapped in the
Face by the Invisible Hand: Banking and the Panic of 2007, at 1 (May 9, 2009) (unpub-
lished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1401882.
221 See generally Gorton, supra note 220 (discussing the causes of the credit and liquidity
crisis, and their implication for the development of future banking regulation).
222 See, e.g., Annalyn Censky, Bernanke: Fed Was ‘Helpless’ in Lehman Failure, CNNMONEY
(Mar. 27, 2012, 3:08 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/03/27/news/economy/
bernanke-gwu-lecture/index.htm (describing a lecture by Chairman Bernanke in which he
argued that bailing out AIG and Bear Stearns was “necessary”); Ronald D. Orol, Geithner
Defends Bank Bailouts at Town-Hall Meeting, Market Watch, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 10, 2009, 7:41
PM), (recounting reasons given by Treasury Secretary Geithner as to why the bailouts were
necessary, including keeping companies from failing, unemployment from rising, and pen-
sion values from falling dramatically); Robert Weisman, Former Treasury Secretary Paulson
Defends ‘08 Bailouts, BOS. GLOBE (June 19, 2012), http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/
2012/06/19/hank/1YGbMFJDMprNQFeZmduikI/story.html (explaining Treasury Secre-
tary’s Paulson’s support of the 2008 bailout).
223 Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 439 (2011).
224 Id.
225 Block, supra note 213, at 154; Levitin, supra note 223, at 439 (“Law is an insufficient
commitment device for avoiding bailouts altogether.  It is impossible to produce binding
commitment to a preset resolution process, irrespective of results.  The financial Ulysses
cannot be bound to the mast.  Although we may want Ulysses to be bound to the mast
when the sailing is smooth to avoid the sirens’ call of politically directed state intervention
in the market, the situation changes once the ship has hit the rocks.  Once the ship is
foundering, we do not want Ulysses to be bound to the mast, lest he go down with the ship
and drown.” (footnotes omitted)).
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the risks posed to the insurance fund—bad drivers pay more for car insur-
ance than good drivers.  Likewise, risky banks pay more than safer banks.226
A similar system could be set up to formalize emergency bailouts.  However,
this solution is problematic and perhaps unrealistic for at least two reasons.
First, all parties must recognize that these bailouts will continue to occur.
Policymakers have not conceded this in the aftermath of the crisis.  In fact,
they have made repeated declarations that they will no longer bail out the
banks.227  Second, there must be a way to price accurately for the risks posed
by the specific institution.  After the crisis, many of the metrics used to pre-
dict bank risk, such as capital and comprehensive CAMELS ratings,228 have
come under attack because many of the banks that failed met these require-
ments right up until the point of failure.229
Despite these difficulties, the premise that future bailouts need to be
accounted for today in structuring bank regulation is at the heart of the
social contract.  Recognizing that bailouts will always be a part of the bank/
government partnership since banks have become TBTF is a crucial starting
point in framing the social contract.  Because such bailouts are inevitable,
large banks and their rescuing government need to clarify the terms of their
relationship.  Otherwise, it is likely that when banks are in smooth waters and
bailouts are not needed, they will tend to forget their tie to the government
and the populace and focus only on profits instead of the needs of the
public.
a. TARP
Although the bailout of the nation’s financial firms involved a variety of
measures, including expanded access to the federal discount window and
increased FDIC deposit limits,230 the largest component of the bailout was
226 CARNELL ET AL., supra note 58, at 316–18.
227 See, e.g., Frank James, Obama: Financial Bill Means ‘No More . . . Bailouts, Period,’ NPR
(July 15, 2010, 6:23 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2010/07/15/
128549117/obama-financial-bill-means-no-more-bailouts-period (“In one of his boldest
claims, Obama said the new legislation would mean ‘no more taxpayer-funded bailouts,
period.’”).
228 The CAMELS rating system, which stands for Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Man-
agement, Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to market risk, is a comprehensive evaluation
of a bank’s risk profile. CARNELL ET AL., supra note 58, at 633–40.
229 Tom Hinkel, CAMELS Ratings and Financial Regulatory Reform: the (M)anagement Ele-
ment, SAFE SYS. NEWSLETTER (Aug. 2010), http://news.safesystems.com/2010/08/camels-
ratings-and-financial-regulatory-reform-the-management-element/#_ftn2 (noting that both
Washington Mutual and Indy Mac Bank had favorable CAMELS ratings just before failure
in 2008).
230 See Ivry, supra note 215 (discussing the volume and secrecy of the bailout funds
provided by the Fed); THE WEEK, supra note 214 (noting the sheer volume of the secret
and emergency loans provided by the Fed); Press Release, FDIC, Basic FDIC Insurance
Coverage Permanently Increased to $250,000 Per Depositor (July 21, 2010), available at
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2010/pr10161.html (announcing a permanent
increase in FDIC deposit insurance from $100,000 to $250,000).
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the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).  In England, Paul Tucker urged
all banks to “recognise that their relatively calm passage through the crisis to
date owes a lot to government standing behind their peers.”231  The same is
true here, and the government accomplished the rescue mainly through
TARP.  Through TARP, the federal government under two administrations
invested approximately $431 billion to shore up the nation’s banks.232  Most
of these funds went to the largest banks.233  As mentioned above, and as codi-
fied in the law, one of the main justifications for TARP was to provide mort-
gage relief to cash-strapped homeowners.234  Instead, these funds went to
shore up large banks through government purchase of their liabilities and
through cash infusions.235
In giving this aid to the large banks, the government never explicitly
demanded anything in return, and it quickly became apparent that banks
would not use these funds for public-serving purposes.  Instead, they shored
up their balance sheets by saving their cash for a rainy day.236  Soon, the
public also learned of bonuses given to bank executives with TARP funds.237
Clearly, the banking sector, which was not accustomed to meeting public
needs, rejected their intermediary function—that it was their responsibility
to take these government funds and lend. The New York Times quoted one
banker and recipient of $300 million in TARP funds stating: “Make more
loans? . . . . We’re not going to change our business model or our credit
policies to accommodate the needs of the public sector. . . .”238  Neither did
the Treasury make any demands that the money be used to reach the pub-
lic.239  Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner seemed satisfied that banks were
231 Paul Tucker, Deputy Governor, Bank of Eng., Regimes for Handling Bank Failures:
Redrawing the Banking Social Contract (June 30, 2009), available at http://www.bankofen-
gland.co.uk/archive/Documents/historicpubs/speeches/2009/speech396.pdf.
232 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, REPORT OF THE TROUBLED ASSETS RELIEF PROGRAM—MARCH
2012, at 1 (Mar. 28, 2012), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/
attachments/03-28-2012TARP.pdf.
233 See Bailout Recipients, PROPUBLICA, http://projects.propublica.org/bailout/list (last
updated Nov. 26, 2013) (documenting the amounts disbursed to each entity by the federal
government).
234 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C. § 5201 (2012).
235 McIntire, supra note 4, at A20.
236 Christopher Carey, the chief financial officer of City National, indicated that “the
bank[s] planned to retain the TARP money to build a ‘fortressed balance sheet’ in case the
economy got worse.” BAROFSKY, supra note 2, at 99.
237 While most of this outrage focused on AIG, there were other incidents of this as
well, including an incident involving Citigroup. See Michael Shnayerson, Wall Street’s $16
Billion Bonus, 583 VANITY FAIR 230 (2009), available at www.vanityfair.com/politics/fea-
tures/2009/03/wall-street-bonuses200903#.
238 McIntire, supra note 4, at A1.
239 Neil M. Barofsky, Op-Ed., Where the Bailout Went Wrong, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2011, at
A27, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/30/opinion/30barofsky.html?_r=0&
gwh=9C01C55D68B250A393A5089A97A18E10 (“Treasury, however, provided the money
to banks with no effective policy or effort to compel the extension of credit.  There were
no strings attached: no requirement or even incentive to increase lending to home buyers,
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returning to profitability and used that as a metric for measuring success.240
Some inside the administration241 and outside242 challenged this perspective
and claimed that the funds should have gone to taxpayers directly and not to
poorly managed banks.  But to date, policymakers have not proposed that
banks should have been obligated to use the government money to help the
public, even if that would have hurt their bottom line.243  The Treasury
seemed to believe that the most it could ask of banks is to stay profitable and
then to hope that once they are profitable enough, they would start to lend
to the public.244  For example, in discussing mortgage modifications, the
Treasury discussed the program as one that would be good for consumers
and also better for banks because they would be able to avoid costly
foreclosures.245
C. The Post-Crisis Social Contract
The post-crisis reforms have not fundamentally changed the status quo
with respect to banks’ duties to the public.  However, a new relationship has
been formed between the large banks and the government.  Due to several
new reforms, the large banks and the government are now working together
in designing banking regulation.  Below, I will describe the new reforms, the
nature of the TBTF problem, the effect of these banks on government policy,
and the reasons the new government-bank partnership is not likely to be pub-
lic-protecting.
and against our strong recommendation, not even a request that banks report how they
used TARP funds.”).
240 See, e.g., SHEILA BAIR, BULL BY THE HORNS 153 (2012) (“I don’t think helping home
owners was ever a priority for [Geithner or Summers].”).
241 See generally id. (describing the efforts of FDIC Chair Sheila Bair to convince admin-
istration officials to do more to help “main street” and the resistance from officials like
Secretary Geithner).
242 BAROFSKY, supra note 2, at 155–57.
243 Deborah Solomon, Will TARP Make a Profit? That’s the Wrong Question, BLOOMBERG
(Apr. 27, 2012, 2:58 PM), www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-27/will-tarp-make-a-profit-
that-s-the-wrong-question.html.
244 “In addition to failing to include terms that would provide incentives to increase
lending, Treasury didn’t require the banks to report on how they were using TARP funds.”
BAROFSKY, supra note 2, at 73; see Barofsky, supra note 239, at A27 (“Treasury . . . provided
the money to banks with no effective policy or effort to compel the extension of credit.”).
245 See Memorandum from Michael Stegman, Counselor for Hous. Fin. Policy, Dep’t of
the Treasury, to Ed DeMarco, Acting Director, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, at 1 (July 31, 2012)
(attached to Letter from Timothy Geithner, Secretary, Dep’t of the Treasury, to Ed
DeMarco, Acting Director, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency (July 31, 2012)), available at
blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/files/2012/07/Sec-Geithner-Letter-to-FHFA-on-Principal-
Reduction.pdf (“The available evidence on HAMP-PRA, as well as industry practice, indi-
cates that targeted principal reduction makes economic sense for the holder of the credit
risk.”).
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1. Dodd-Frank
Dodd-Frank was the regulatory response to the financial crisis of 2008.
Although it attempts to ensure financial stability and banking accountability,
it is widely regarded as falling short of those goals.246  Some claim that the
act introduces complexity that not only misses big problems, but also
increases costs of compliance.247  Others claim that these reforms are not
likely to end future bailouts or restore safety and soundness.248  Above all,
Dodd-Frank was a missed opportunity for the government to reassert its rela-
tionship with the nation’s banks.249
Dodd-Frank and other post-crisis regulatory reforms have not addressed
the proper question—specifically, what duties do banks owe to society?
Instead, assuming that the status quo is tenable, policymakers have plugged
holes and filled gaps in a tattered and spent regulatory structure created dur-
ing the deregulatory era.  Indeed, there were public humiliations focused on
246 See DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL 140–41 (2011) (explaining that Dodd-
Frank encourages delay and bailout rather than truly holding banks accountable); Brett H.
McDonnell, Financial Regulation Reform and Too Big to Fail, 1 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 113, 113
(2012) (suggesting that “the leading critique of the Dodd-Frank Act from the left is that it
does too little to address the problem of too big to fail (TBTF) financial institutions”);
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response to the Too-Big-to-
Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951, 956 (2011) (concluding that Dodd-Frank is ultimately too
weak to prevent the “too big to fail” problem and noting that “[t]his critique is not unique
to the left—many on the right make similar arguments”); The Dodd-Frank Act: Too Big Not to
Fail, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 18, 2012, at 22, available at http://www.economist.com/node/
21547784 (arguing that the Dodd-Frank Act attempted to address needed regulation in the
banking industry, but that is has become clear that the “risk that the harm done by the
massive cost and complexity of its regulations, and the effects of its internal inconsisten-
cies, will outweigh what good may yet come from it”).
247 Haldane & Madouros, supra note 152, at 12.
248 See SKEEL, supra note 246, at 140; Eugene A. Ludwig, Assessment of Dodd-Frank Finan-
cial Regulatory Reform: Strengths, Challenges, and Opportunities for a Stronger Regulatory System, 29
YALE J. ON REG. 181, 192 (2012) (“Dodd-Frank, however, severely overcompensates for lax
regulation.  Too many of the legislation’s components are largely unnecessary, and its
sheer magnitude could actually challenge safety and soundness by focusing an excessive
amount of management attention on less critical issues.”); Jonathan R. Macey & James P.
Holdcroft, Jr., Failure Is an Option: An Ersatz-Antitrust Approach to Financial Regulation, 120
YALE L.J. 1368, 1389 (2011) (“In fact, there is reason to believe that the Dodd-Frank Act
actually will increase the probability that financial institutions in general, and insurance
companies in particular, will be bailed out in the future.”); Mark A. Calabria, Dodd-Frank
Law: Regulations Won’t Fix What’s Wrong, PHILA. INQUIRER (Dec. 5, 2011), http://articles.
philly.com/2011-12-05/news/30477992_1_fannie-and-freddie-consumer-financial-protec-
tion-bureau-housing-bubble (arguing that the safety and soundness provisions of Dodd-
Frank are misguided).
249 SKEEL, supra note 246, at 94 (emphasizing that “the Dodd-Frank Act invites the gov-
ernment to channel political policy through the big financial institutions by giving regula-
tors sweeping discretion in the enforcement of each of the provisions [that have been
previously discussed]”).
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individual wrongdoing by bank executives,250 lawsuits exposing banks’ fraud
and malfeasance,251 and a myriad of explanations of the crisis.252  But the
dominant assumption remained that foremost among policymakers’ con-
cerns was that the large banks remain stable and profitable.253
The relationship between the government and its banks has been misun-
derstood for so long that even those reforms that Dodd-Frank has advanced
have been met with strong opposition not just from Wall Street,254 but also
from Congress, other regulators,255 and the federal circuit courts.256  Wall
Street lobbyists, many of whom are ex-regulators, vigorously fought the new
rules on behalf of banks right after those banks were bailed out by the federal
government.257  Follow-up lobbying weakened the reforms and secured
250 See, e.g., Nathan Vardi, Goldman Sachs’ Long Day in Washington, FORBES (Apr. 27,
2010, 7:36 PM), www.forbes.com/sites/streettalk/2010/04/27/goldman-sachs-long-day-in-
washington/ (“It was a grueling Tuesday in Washington for Goldman Sachs Chief Execu-
tive Lloyd Blankfein and other Goldman executives, who struggled to explain themselves
before a panel of U.S. senators.  They were portrayed as Las Vegas pit bosses and bookies
who peddled [bad] products that helped bring the U.S. financial system to the brink of
collapse.”).
251 See, e.g., Chris Isidore, Bank of America Sued for Alleged Mortgage Fraud, CNNMONEY
(Oct. 25, 2012, 8:19 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/10/24/news/companies/bank-of-
america-lawsuit/index.html (“The Justice Department is seeking $1 billion from Bank of
America, alleging the bank committed fraud by selling defective mortgages from a pro-
gram it says was known within the bank as ‘the Hustle.’”).
252 Adam J. Levitin, Foreword, The Crisis Without A Face: Emerging Narratives of the Financial
Crisis, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 999, 1001–04 (2009) (summarizing initial explanations of the
crisis).
253 See infra Section III.A.
254 See Ryan Grim, Wall Street Opposes Wall Street Reform, HUFFINGTON POST (June 28,
2010, 1:42 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/06/28/wall-street-opposes-wall_n_
627870.html (last updated May 25, 2011, 5:55 PM).
255 See John Berlau, Democrats Now Rejecting Dodd-Frank, NEWSMAX (Oct. 30, 2012, 10:10
AM), www.newsmax.com/BerlauMN/Democrats-Dodd-Frank-reform/2012/10/30/id/
462037 (noting the diverse group of regulators and interest groups who opposed the
reforms); Ben Protess, Former S.E.C. Chief Says Dodd-Frank Misses Goals, N.Y. TIMES (July 12,
2011, 7:26 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/07/12/former-s-e-c-chairman-criti-
cizes-dodd-frank/ (discussing former S.E.C. chairman Harvey Pitt’s criticisms of the Dodd-
Frank Act).
256 The D.C. Circuit has presented significant challenges to banking and securities reg-
ulators by invalidating many of their proposed rules or sending them back for further
analysis. See Ben Protess, As Wall Street Fights Regulation, It Has Backup on the Bench, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 25, 2012, at F2 (“Deep in enemy territory, Wall Street has found a powerful
ally.  [The D.C. Circuit] has become ground zero for legal challenges to financial
reform.”); Ben Protess, Judge Strikes Down a Dodd-Frank Trading Rule, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28,
2012, 6:21 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/09/28/judge-strikes-down-dodd-
frank-trading-rule/ (discussing the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia striking
down a second Dodd-Frank rule).
257 See, e.g., Eric Lichtblau, Ex-Regulators Lobby to Shape Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES, July 28,
2010, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/28/business/28lobby.html?
pagewanted=all&_r=0 (noting that roughly 150 ex-financial regulators registered as bank-
ing lobbyists from 2009 to 2010).
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enough loopholes in the remaining legislation to allow business as usual to
continue for these banks.258  Congress, which passed Dodd-Frank, also
opposed funding and appointing a director to the agency meant to enforce
its provisions.259
To be sure, reforms are under way.  Many will aim to make banks safer
and protect consumers.260  In Part IV, I outline several of the major reforms
put in place by Dodd-Frank, including the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (CFPB) and other safety and soundness measures meant to reduce
risks and increase transparency.
2. Too Big To Fail
The social contract outlined above has worked fairly well with the small
and mid-sized banks of this country, but has failed with respect to large
banks.  This is in part due to the fact that these large banks are recent addi-
tions to the banking fold.  Many of these large banks were operating as invest-
ment banks, but they are now bank holding companies: many of them hold
depository institutions (commercial banks), but their assets are also non-
depository assets tied up in the securities, credit, insurance, and derivatives
markets.  They operate in almost every developed country in the world and
they have extensive political influence.  Large banks (or “mega banks”) are
those with assets between $250 billion and $2.3 trillion.261  There are only
twelve of these behemoths after the crisis and they represent only 0.2 percent
of all banks, but together they hold almost seventy percent of the country’s
banking assets.262
There are several reasons for the discrepancy between small and large
banks and the breakdown of the social contract with the latter.  First, as their
258 Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry Self-
Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 463–64 (2011).
259 See Phil Mattingly & Joshua Gallu, U.S. Congress Blunts Agency Fund Request to Enforce
Dodd-Frank, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 20, 2010, 9:27 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2010-12-22/dodd-frank-enforcement-funds-delayed-as-lawmakers-pass-stopgap-legislation.
html; Brian Montopoli, Senate GOP Blocks Possible Elizabeth Warren Recess Appointment, CBS
NEWS (May 27, 2011, 1:04 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20066828-
503544.html; James B. Stewart, As Watchdog Starves, Wall Street Is Tossed a Bone, N.Y. TIMES,
July 16, 2011, at A1, B7, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B06
E5DB1E3DF935A25754C0A9679D8B63; George Zornick, GOP Blocks Cordray’s Nomination
to Head the CFPB, THE NATION (Dec. 8, 2011, 12:45 PM), http://www.thenation.com/blog/
165054/gop-blocks-cordrays-nomination-head-cfpb.
260 See Emily McCormick, The Good Side of Dodd-Frank: How the Law Will Benefit the Bank-
ing Industry, BANK DIRECTOR (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.bankdirector.com/board-issues/
legal/the-good-side-of-dodd-frank-how-the-law-will-benefit-the-banking/ (citing generally
accepted positive aspects of Dodd-Frank such as its consumer protection focus, creation of
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, leveling of the playing field between banks
and non-bank financial institutions, and creation of the Financial Stability Oversight
Council).
261 Fisher, supra note 8.
262 Id.
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name indicates, because these banks are too big to fail, they are too big to
punish or even threaten.  Regulatory discipline has failed with the large
banks—these banks cannot be easily punished for their bad behavior, and
therefore moral hazard runs high.  Regulators have authority over these
firms, but because their activities are so complex and fast-moving, regulators
often cannot keep up.  Small banks that are failing must submit to the FDIC
resolution process, where the regulators take over a failing bank immediately
and manage either its liquidation or reorganization.  The process is smooth
and speedy.  In contrast, large banks—because so many of their assets are
non-depository and tied up in capital or derivative markets all over the
world—cannot easily be restructured through bankruptcy.  Therefore, hold-
ing the Sword of Damocles over banks’ heads is only meaningful to those
who don’t have the shield of being too big to fail.  Dodd-Frank’s living will
provision promises to ensure the orderly liquidation of these large banks in
the event of a future collapse.263  However, most experts are skeptical that
the living wills can or will be enforced absent major reforms to the structure
of these provisions as well as to these banks.264
Second, market discipline has also failed with these mega-banks.  Rich-
ard Fisher, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas observed of
these large banks that “the forces of market discipline from shareholders and
unsecured creditors are limited . . . . TBTF status exerts perverse market disci-
pline on the risk-taking activities of these banks.”265  Because the creditors of
these banks are aware of their TBTF status, they receive discounted prices
and less market vigilance.266  Therefore, the government safety net gives
TBTF banks a subsidy greater than that enjoyed by other insured banks.267
Moreover, the subsidy for these banks “has risen following the financial
crisis.”268
Third, the activities of these firms are inherently more risky and more of
a threat to systemic stability.  These firms operate in a variety of markets in
many countries, and their non-depository activities are the bulk of their bal-
ance sheets.  Their size and interconnectedness expose these firms to conta-
gion making them more vulnerable to collapse.269  They are also very highly
leveraged with an average leverage ratio of 1 to 25270 compared to commer-
263 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1423–32 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365 (2012)).
264 See SKEEL, supra note 246, at 141 (“[M]anagers are unlikely to devise serious and
realistic plans unless regulators are unusually vigilant in enforcing the new obligation [to
draft a living will].”).
265 Fisher, supra note 8.
266 Id. There is also a growing sense that these firms are “too big to prosecute” as seen
by the Justice Department’s reluctance to prosecute any of the large banks for malfeasance.
267 Id.
268 Id.
269 Levitin, supra note 223, at 463, 465.
270 Yalman Onaran, U.S. Banks’ Leverage Should Be Halved to Cut Risks, Bair Says, BLOOM-
BERG (Sept. 26, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-26/u-s-banks-leverage-
should-be-halved-to-cut-risks-bair-says.html.
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cial banks, which have a target leverage ratio of 1 to 12.271  In addition to
their leverage, the markets in which they operate are higher risk than com-
mercial banks.272  Commercial banks still profit from traditional lending and
depository activities while these large banks do everything else that makes the
capital, credit, and derivatives markets run.
Finally, because of their size and importance, these banks are very politi-
cally powerful.  And this power and influence is the reason the social contract
is askew.  In fact, the crisis augmented these banks’ already growing power
and influence.273  Recently, through certain measures in the Dodd-Frank
Act, a new relationship has been formed between the government and the
largest banks.  The partnership is formed because once a firm is labeled a
“systemically important financial institution” (SIFI), it is watched closely by
the newly-formed Financial Stability Oversight Counsel (FSOC), which
includes the leaders of all the banking regulators, but is chaired by the Trea-
sury, the most political of the bank regulators.274  There are many provisions
of Dodd-Frank that give FSOC unfettered discretion in regulating these
firms.  In effect, the SIFIs work closely with FSOC in formulating regulation
and implementing reforms.  These large banks will influence banking policy,
and perhaps more general government policy, going forward.  This is indeed
the fruition of Jefferson’s and Brandeis’s greatest fears.
3. Corporatism
David Skeel refers to this partnership as corporatism—a conflict-prone
relationship between the most powerful banks and the federal govern-
ment.275  Corporatism strengthens bank power, size, and influence over
policymakers.  The partnership benefits both the large banks and the federal
government.  On the one hand, the largest banks get to remain large, receive
a market subsidy and have the ear of the Treasury.  It is also more likely these
firms will be bailed out in the future.  Cross-country studies support this con-
clusion, showing that the more connected a firm is to the rescuing institu-
tion, the more likely a bailout will occur.276  On the other hand, once the
government gets control over large powerful institutions, it is able to use
them for its own political ends, including as tools of domestic and foreign
policy on issues well outside the realm of banking.  Skeel uses, as an example
271 Id.
272 Fisher, supra note 8.
273 Stephen Gandel, By Every Measure, the Big Banks Are Bigger, CNNMONEY (Sept. 13,
2013), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2013/09/13/too-big-to-fail-banks/.
274 The Treasury is the only banking regulator that is located in the President’s cabinet.
It is widely regarded as being the most politically sensitive.  In contrast, both the FDIC and
the Federal Reserve are independent agencies. SKEEL, supra note 246, at 12.
275 SKEEL, supra note 246, at 9–11.  He distinguishes Corporatism from a Brandeisian
approach, which would have lessened the power of the largest banks.  The modern
Brandeisians advocated breaking up the banks and ending TBTF bailouts because of a fear
that the banking oligarchy would use their resources to “capture” or co-opt the state. Id.
276 See GROSSMAN, supra note 22, at 97.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\89-3\NDL306.txt unknown Seq: 47 17-FEB-14 14:20
2014] banking  and  the  social  contract 1329
by analogy, the Obama Administration giving Fiat a larger ownership stake in
Chrysler in exchange for its promise to promote the Administration’s policy
goal of energy efficiency by promising to roll out a more energy-efficient car
in the U.S.277
This newly formed relationship, which benefits both the government
and the banks leaves out a critical part of the social contract—the people.
Although the government represents the people, its aims, as it relates to bank
policy, may diverge from public need.  This is true for many political econ-
omy reasons—such as reelection concerns, lobbying, the revolving door,278
and the fact that interested minorities often exert more political pressure
than the diffuse populace.  Thus, political aims are not always matched with
the people’s.  This problem is exacerbated now as banks and policymakers
become closer and work together to shape policy.  There is necessarily a ten-
sion between the desires of banks and the desires of the public.  Banks desire
high profits and insofar as stability leads to profits, banks also desire stability.
There is also a tension between offering profitable credit products and offer-
ing ones that are safe and fair.  The public wants stability, access to credit,
and fair and safe products.  When these goals conflict, banking regulators
must be the public representative that forces banks to meet these needs.
Corporatism makes that difficult.  This is the reason the social contract must
be re-written to explicitly require regulators to take account of the public’s
needs.
4. Breaking Up the Banks
One option, proposed by many, to remedy the current problem with the
large banks is for the government to break them up.  Many advocate that
these banks be broken up along their activity lines.279  For example, a large
bank holding company could be broken up into several independent units,
such as an insurance firm, a broker-dealer, a hedge fund, a commercial bank-
ing network, and a securities underwriter.  This division harkens back to the
Glass-Steagall era separation of banking and commerce.  It has the advantage
of containing FDIC insurance and other federal subsidies within the banking
unit and preventing the FDIC subsidy from subsidizing unregulated portions
277 SKEEL, supra note 246, at 92–93.
278 See Claire Hill & Richard Painter, Compromised Fiduciaries: Conflicts of Interest in Gov-
ernment and Business, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1637, 1669, 1677 (2011).
279 See, e.g., Roberta S. Karmel, An Orderly Liquidation Authority Is Not the Solution to Too-
Big-to-Fail, 6 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 1, 44–45 (2011) (“[Stiglitz] suggests a ‘three-
pronged attack’: (1) breaking up institutions that are too big to fail; (2) ‘restrict-
ing . . . activities in which [the] remaining institutions can be engaged’; and (3) correlating
‘deposit insurance and capital adequacy restrictions to [even out] the playing field.’”
(alterations in original) (citation omitted)); Brad Miller, The Right Way to Break Up the
Banks, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 21, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-21/use-
stand-alone-subsidiaries-to-break-up-megabanks.html (“According to Bair, megabank oper-
ations should be ‘simplified and subsidiarized’ into ‘discrete, separately managed legal
entities’ based on business lines.”).
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of the firm.  Without the TBTF imprimatur shielding the firm from market
discipline, counterparties could more easily monitor those units engaged in
higher risk “commercial ventures.”
This course of action would essentially rewrite the New Deal era social
contract for a changed world.  Although breaking up these large firms is the
best and perhaps only way to ensure systemic stability, it may not be practi-
cally or politically feasible.  The financial landscape may be too changed to
try to force a 1930s-era separation on these firms.  In addition, it is unlikely,
given the influence of these large firms, that any effort to break them up
could overcome the political opposition that will likely be unleashed.  This is
not to say that it should not be attempted, but given the substantial barriers
in achieving a break-up of the large banks, policymakers need to reconsider
the social contract as it applies to the situation today.
III. REVISING THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
If the banks are to remain large and powerful and capable of causing
systemic panic and collapse with only the government standing between
them and failure, the government must demand more from these banks than
they currently do.  I propose a three part social contract.  Not all of these
suggestions are unique, but so far they have stood alone as independent pro-
posals for banking reform.  In reviving the social contract, the government
needs to be clear that of paramount importance in banking are safety and
soundness, consumer protection, and access to credit.  These three pillars
should define the new social contract between government and banks.  This
charge requires an ideological shift in our understanding of banks and the
government’s regulatory mission.  Banks must retain the ability to make prof-
its for their shareholders, but that cannot be the only requirement imposed
by regulators on banks.  Banks do not operate in the markets like most other
corporate entities.  They are tasked with public functions and given access to
public safety nets.  They allow other corporations to increase profits and
function free of state control, but they themselves are necessarily tethered to
the state.  And this tethering has implications that have been ignored by
modern policymakers.
The ideological shift I advocate requires regulators to emphasize the
public’s needs when regulating banks.  The public needs banks that are safe,
that are accessible to all, and that deal fairly with consumers. Regulators
should ensure that banks meet these needs, even if the changes result in
banks forgoing maximum profitability.  This charge differs from corporatism,
which as described above is the formation of a close relationship between
large banks and the government that results in a quid pro quo of powers and
influence.  Corporatism does not ensure that public needs are met first and
leads to a problematic concentration of political and economic power.  On
the other hand, I also do not advocate making banks into public utilities, as
advocated by Brandeis.  Market competition is not the enemy of sound bank-
ing.  With targeted regulation, it is possible to allow banks to compete for
customers and do so responsibly while meeting public needs.
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A. Safety and Soundness
As the details of many of the regulations are still being negotiated, schol-
ars and industry observers have suggested a variety of measures to ensure
safety and soundness in banking.  These proposals include prohibitions on
derivatives trades,280 higher capital reserves,281 contingent capital,282 self-
regulation,283 and more thorough regulatory oversight.284  Such proposals
are on the right track as they do not focus on profits, but rather prohibit
activities that are risky, force banks to invest in products with their own
money (“skin in the game”), or call for more stringent and comprehensive
supervision of banks.  This Article does not advocate any particular measure,
but makes the claim that a strong regulatory focus on safety and soundness
must be implemented and enforced by regulators if the federal government
is going to bear the costs of bank failures.  The social contract must be rewrit-
ten to include such measures so long as the government has such a large
stake in bank success.
As discussed above, bank profitability cannot serve as a regulatory proxy
for bank safety and soundness.  While it is true that a profitable bank is often
a safe one and that profitability can be a good indicator of a bank’s stability,
it is not necessarily so.  As the last three decades have demonstrated, banks
can be profitable and still engage in unsafe practices.  Therefore, while prof-
itability can signal safety and soundness, the scope of the regulatory inquiry
into safety and soundness needs to be more nuanced.  How can safety and
soundness be measured if not by bank profitability?  Before deregulation,
bank safety was a matter of bright line rules and prohibitions.285  Safety was
assured by prohibiting banks from engaging in risky business practices.
Going back to those prohibitions would be like putting the proverbial genie
back in the bottle.
The shadow banking system and modern financial innovation make the
stark separations once laid down by the Glass-Steagall Act nearly impossible
to re-create.  The Volcker Rule, however, currently part of Dodd-Frank, could
potentially re-impose a portion of the Glass-Steagall Act’s divisions as adapted
to the modern financial system and effectively silo high-risk activities, such as
280 THOMAS M. HOENIG & CHARLES S. MORRIS, RESTRUCTURING THE BANKING SYSTEM TO
IMPROVE SAFETY AND SOUNDNESS 1–2 (2011), available at http://www.fdic.gov/about/learn/
board/Restructuring-the-Banking-System-05-24-11.pdf.
281 Anat R. Admati et al., Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital
Regulation: Why Bank Equity Is Not Socially Expensive 6 (Rock Ctr. for Corporate Governance
at Stanford Univ., Working Paper No. 86, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1669704.
282 Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corpo-
rate Governance, 26 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 281, 293–96 (2012).
283 Omarova, supra note 258, at 417–18.
284 Edgar Ortega Barrales, Note, Lessons from the Flash Crash for the Regulation of High-
Frequency Traders, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 1195 (2012).
285 See generally Sherman, supra note 218, at 3–6 (discussing the introduction of regula-
tory reform following the Great Depression and chronicling its demise leading up to the
recent financial crisis).
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proprietary trading, from the rest of the firm.286  This would come short of
breaking up the banks, but would at least separate activities within each large
bank.
The Dodd-Frank Act does indeed focus on safety and soundness, but it is
too soon to say whether its stated goals of enforcing “strict oversight of finan-
cial institutions that pose systemic risks” will lead to reduced risk-taking by
these firms.287  Most of the Dodd-Frank reforms have yet to be implemented
and, as with most financial regulation, many of these changes will be discre-
tionary.  The FSOC will be responsible for overseeing systemic risk problems
and for addressing those concerns with firms designated SIFIs.  Will these
regulators be able to spot the subprime-mortgage crisis of the future?  Much
will depend on whether the regulators are able to see beyond profits secured
during the next bubble to identify underlying and latent risks.  An analysis of
whether recent reforms have shifted regulatory focus away from profits to
actual risk taking is outside the scope of this Article and likely premature.
Too much work on implementing these reforms remains to be done.
B. Consumer Protection
Perhaps the biggest lapse in regulatory oversight over the last thirty years
has been in protecting consumers from harmful, obscure, and sometimes
predatory credit products.  Scholars have made a strong case that the credit
markets in this country are broken, and that consumer credit products are
wrought with fraud, discrimination, and unnecessary complexity.288  Banks
and credit card companies have made their products more opaque and more
costly to the average customer and because consumers cannot adequately
gauge the level of risk in certain terms, they have gone largely uncontested.
There have also been reports of fraud and discrimination in mortgage lend-
ing during the lead-up to the financial crisis.289  Large banks have been the
biggest offenders because of their standardized products and their insatiable
appetite for subprime loans during the housing bubble.
286 See R. Rex Chatterjee, Dictionaries Fail: The Volcker Rule’s Reliance on Definitions Renders
It Ineffective and a New Solution Is Needed to Adequately Regulate Proprietary Trading, 8 INT’L L. &
MGMT. REV. 33, 42 (2011); Macey & Holdcroft, Jr., supra note 248, at 1397–98.
287 Macon Phillips, Overhaul, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Feb. 25, 2009), http://www.
whitehouse.gov/blog/09/02/25/Overhaul/.
288 See, e.g., Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 130, at 1–2 (arguing for a fundamental
restructuring of consumer credit regulation including the creation of a new federal regula-
tor); Adam J. Levitin, Rate-Jacking: Risk-Based & Opportunistic Pricing in Credit Cards, 2011
UTAH L. REV. 339, 365–66 (explaining why market factors have not corrected the risky
practice of “rate-jacking”); Warren, supra note 144, at 16–18 (advocating for a Financial
Product Safety Commission to protect consumers of credit products via an analogy to regu-
lation of tangible consumer goods).
289 Savage, Countrywide, supra note 109 (noting that Countrywide settled with the Jus-
tice Department over allegations that it charged higher rates and fees to minority borrow-
ers); Savage, Wells Fargo supra note 109 (noting that Wells Fargo settled with the Justice
Department over allegations that it charged higher rates and fees to minority borrowers).
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Targeted consumer protection laws can deter these banks and other
financial services providers from taking advantage of their customers to make
a profit.  If the government is to support banks, it must assure that consumers
are protected from discrimination, fraud, and predatory behavior in lending.
Moreover, these reforms might actually help ensure the safety and soundness
of the financial system because many of the products that are harmful to
consumers are also harmful to markets and the economy in general.  Sub-
prime mortgages are an illustrative example.
A few scholars, led by now-Senator Elizabeth Warren, proposed the
establishment of a new regulator to protect consumers from unregulated and
unsafe banking products.290  These scholars point out that because safety
and soundness has been equated with profitability, consumer protection is
not enforced by and actually contradicts the mission of the federal banking
regulators.291  These calls for a consumer protection agency have been
answered by Dodd-Frank’s creation of the Consumer Financial Protection
290 See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 130; cf. Adam J. Levitin, Hydraulic Regulation: Regu-
lating Credit Markets Upstream, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 143, 146 (2009) (proposing “reinvigo-
rating the role of state regulators as consumer-protection advocates”).
291 Who’s Watching the Watchmen? Oversight of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on TARP, Fin. Servs., and Bailouts of Pub. and Private Programs of
the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 112th Cong. 64 (2011) (statement of Adam J.
Levitin, Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center), available at http:/
/oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/5-24-11-Subcommittee-on-TARP-
Financial-Services-and-Bailouts-of-Public-and-Private-Programs-Hearing-Transcript.pdf
(“Now, bank safety and soundness is a technical term. It means profitability. . . . [But]
consumer protection is often at loggerheads with bank profit.”); Legislative Proposals to
Improve the Structure of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Before the Subcomm. on Fin.
Inst. and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 4 (2011) (statement of
Adam J. Levitin, Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center), available
at http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/040611levitin.pdf (“[T]he OCC has
amply proven that when tasked with both bank safety-and-soundness—that is profitabil-
ity—and consumer protection, it will always favor banks over consumers.”); Bar-Gill & War-
ren, supra note 130, at 90 (“[Banking] agencies are designed with a primary mission to
protect the safety and soundness of the banking system.  This means protecting banks’
profitability.  Consumer protection is, at best, a lesser priority . . . .” (footnote omitted));
Creola Johnson, The Magic of Group Identity: How Predatory Lenders Use Minorities to Target
Communities of Color, 17 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 165, 205 (2010) (noting that federal
banking regulators’ stated goal is safety and soundness, but they are usually focused on
profitability and often oppose states’ attempts at consumer protection); Arthur E. Wil-
marth, Jr., The Financial Services Industry’s Misguided Quest to Undermine the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 881, 932 (2012) (“[D]uring the credit boom
banking agencies focused on near-term profitability as a key indicator of the ‘safety and
soundness’ of financial institutions.”); Bob Herbert, Op-Ed., Derailing Help for Consumers,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2010, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/27/opin-
ion/27herbert.html?_r=0 (describing safety and soundness as a “euphemism” for “profit-
ability”); see also FDIC OFFICES OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, EVALUATION OF PROMPT REGULATORY
ACTION IMPLEMENTATION 4, 6, 11–12, 33–37 (2011), available at http://www.federalreserve.
gov/oig/files/9_30_11_PRA_Final_Issued_Report.pdf (noting regulators’ difficulty
restricting risky behavior while institutions are profitable).
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Bureau (CFPB).  This agency is poised to play a critical role in the rewriting
of the social contract with banks in the area of consumer protection if it has
the support of the legislature and engages in robust rulemaking and
enforcement.292
The large banks vigorously opposed this agency and continue to appeal
many of its decisions.293  There were many political battles over the establish-
ment of such an agency, making it one of the most contested aspects of
Dodd-Frank.294  It became quickly apparent that Elizabeth Warren, whose
name became synonymous with the agency, would not be chosen to lead it
because the opposition from the banking sector was too strong.295  It is too
soon to say whether the agency will remain strong in the face of mounting
opposition, but its charge to protect the public from fraudulent or discrimi-
natory banking products is a crucial tenet of the social contract.
C. Access to Credit
As stated above, post-crisis banking reform has focused on safety and
soundness, and consumer protection is arguably addressed by the CFPB,
whose success will be determined over time.  However, neither Dodd-Frank
nor any other regulatory proposal, program, or talking point has addressed
increased access to credit.  Although the idea has been in the background of
some of the post-crisis dialogue, including in the mortgage relief context,296
it has not been embraced or advocated by any policymakers to date.  This
may have to do with a widespread belief that the financial crisis was, in part,
precipitated by an overabundance of consumer access to mortgage credit.297
Therefore, the case for increasing access to credit is not an obvious one.
292 But as Elizabeth Warren artfully articulated, the agency must be strong in order to
be effective: “ ‘My first choice is a strong consumer agency’ . . . .  ‘My second choice is no
agency at all and plenty of blood and teeth left on the floor.’”  Shahien Nasiripour, Fight
for the CFPA Is ‘A Dispute Between Families and Banks,’ Says Elizabeth Warren, HUFFINGTON POST
(May 25, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/03/03/fight-for-the-cfpa-is-a-d_n_
483707.html.
293 See, e.g., Herbert, supra note 291, at A19 (“[T]he financial industry and other big-
money interests are all but hysterical in their opposition to the Consumer Financial Protec-
tion Agency.”).
294 See, e.g., Ylan Q. Mui, Political Battle Threatens Centerpiece of Financial Reform, WASH.
POST (June 14, 2011), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-06-14/business/
35266014_1_raj-date-cfpb-consumer-financial-protection-bureau (discussing the battle over
President Obama’s appointment of an agency director and how it almost prevented imple-
mentation of the reform).
295 See Ari Berman, The Bank Lobby Steps Up Its Attack on Elizabeth Warren, THE NATION
(June 1, 2011), http://www.thenation.com/article/161069/bank-lobby-steps-its-attack-eliz-
abeth-warren#.
296 MYFICO, MORTGAGE RELIEF FOR U.S. HOMEOWNERS, http://www.myfico.com/mort-
gagerelief/.
297 See Nick Carey, Crisis Cut U.S. Minority Mortgage Access: Study, REUTERS (May 13,
2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/05/13/us-usa-mortgages-minorities-idUSTR
E64C0BC20100513 (“Reckless subprime mortgage lending during the recent economic
boom sparked the worst housing crisis and downturn since the 1930s.”).
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Financial support for the banking system goes hand in hand with ensuring
that the banking system remains safe and low risk.  And prohibiting banks
from taking advantage of customers is fairly uncontroversial.  But why should
government investment in banking impose duties on banks to increase access
to credit?  The answer is that access to credit is one of the theoretical reasons
banks were supported by the government in the first place and, I argue, a
reason to continue their support.
Bank credit not only allows the economy to grow wealth, but also allows
individual families to do so.  Any difference in access (for example, the rich
having more access than the poor) runs counter to the justifications for state
support of banks.  It was this disparity of access that made Thomas Jefferson
wary of bank power.298  Currently, a few large and powerful banks control
the majority of assets in the banking sector and also the majority of credit.299
The social contract must require that these banks focus on increasing lend-
ing to the poor.  Not all banks should have the same responsibilities, such as
providing small loans to the poor, because not all banks are capable of exe-
cuting the task.  But government sponsorship of banks needs to both carve
out a place for and support banks that are tasked with such a mission.  As the
government is currently heavily invested in large banks,300 it is only fair that
these large banks bear some of that responsibility.
Insofar as economic mobility (or at least prohibiting economic disen-
franchisement) is a social good, and credit is the necessary tool to economic
advancement, banks must be involved at some level in enhancing accessibility
for certain individuals and communities.  The number of unbanked or
underbanked (i.e., people without bank accounts or not using them) has
increased since the financial crisis and is now nearly thirty percent of the
population.301  If the banking system is to be supported by the government,
all should be able to access it.  Of course, there are complex reasons why
some people may choose to not have a bank account, such as lack of suffi-
cient funds, class and cultural barriers, lack of trust of the banking system,
etc.  If these barriers are caused by the banking system, they should be elimi-
nated, although some of these obstacles may not be surmountable by regulat-
ing bodies and banks.
However important, focusing on bank accounts blurs the real needs of
the poor, which are access to small loans and good credit options.  Many low-
income individuals are increasingly relying on fringe banks for their credit
needs, and these fringe banks often engage in unscrupulous practices and
298 See supra notes 26–28, 73 and accompanying text.
299 See Gandel, supra note 273.
300 Deborah Solomon et al., U.S. to Buy Stakes in Nation’s Largest Banks, WALL. ST. J.
(Oct. 14, 2008, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB122390023840728367.
301 FDIC, 2011 FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY OF UNBANKED AND UNDERBANKED HOUSEHOLDS
10 (2012) [hereinafter FDIC SURVEY], available at http://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/.
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charge very high interest rates.302  Many of these fringe banks are highly
profitable organizations that are either partnered with or financed by the
large banking sector.303  Access to safe credit is crucial in allowing the poor
to escape poverty.  The premise of supporting banks with government funds
is that they act as intermediaries in the economy—allowing businesses and
individuals to use their services to grow their limited funds.  Currently, the
U.S. banking system is bifurcated with one regulated and government-spon-
sored banking system for the rich and another unregulated, usurious, and
costly fringe banking system for the poor.  To be clear, lending to the poor is
not always profitable.  A bank spends the same amount of resources lending
$1000 or $100,000.304  Therefore, rational profit-seeking banks wisely focus
on larger loans leaving the smaller loans to the payday lenders and others
who are willing to take on this risk for the high profits earned through usuri-
ous interest rates and other questionable practices.305
In the past, the federal government has supported specific banking char-
ters aimed at providing credit to the poor.  Charters for credit unions and
savings and loan associations were both created after the New Deal to accom-
plish this very purpose.306  These financial institutions served low-income
customers who did not otherwise have access to credit in accordance with a
social contract meant to extend the banking safety net to all citizens.  These
banks were successful for many years but, due to financial pressure in the
1970s and 1980s and their subsequent deregulation, many struggled to sur-
vive.307  There are currently few banks designed primarily to provide access
to the poor while the unbanked population steadily increases.308
There are many possible ways that the banking system in partnership
with the federal government could achieve the goal of increased access to
safe credit for the poor.309  Specialized charters could be subsidized by either
the FDIC fund, which collects fees from larger banks, or nonprofit arms of
large banks or stand-alone subsidiaries of larger banks could be established
with specific charters focused on credit access for the poor.  Providing small
loans to the poor is not profitable and therefore traditional banks will not
step in to fill this gap unless incentivized to do so.  Yet, because banking has
public support, banks can fairly be asked to fulfill this important public
mission.
302 CASKEY, supra note 103, at 8; CHRISTOPHER L. PETERSON, TAMING THE SHARKS 10–13
(Christopher P. Banks ed., 2004); Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121,
124 (2004).
303 Barr, supra note 303, at 148.
304 Baradaran, supra note 91, at 493.
305 Id.
306 Id. at 501, 513.
307 Id. at 526.
308 FDIC SURVEY, supra note 302, at 10.  The unbanked population grew by about half a
percentage point from 2009 to 2011 and the underbanked grew by nearly two percentage
points. Id.
309 Baradaran, supra note 91, at 533–47.
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***
In sum, the social contract with banks must take into account the needs
of the public, and that means all of the public.  The social contract must first
be understood and then verbalized by regulators.  This will require a shift in
regulatory focus.  Specifically, regulators should consider public needs, such
as safety and soundness, consumer protection, and access to credit, when
using their discretionary powers to allow banks to perform certain activities.
This public focus should also be reflected in legislation and regulation gov-
erning banks.  Fortunately, as the next Part demonstrates, it already is.
Although the necessary language already exists in various statutes, it must
now be enforced and given “teeth” by regulators.
IV. “PUBLIC BENEFIT” AND THE STATUTORY CODE
The public mission of banks is written into the text of nearly all major
banking legislation.310  For banks to gain approval for mergers, expansions,
or new activities, their primary regulator uses a variety of factors to determine
whether the proposed change should be permitted.  Most of these tests
include an explicit “public benefit” inquiry.  In other words, in order to gain
approval from its regulators, a bank needs to show that the proposed activity
is beneficial to the public.  Because much of this legislation was written dur-
ing and after the New Deal, at a time when the social contract was more
clear, it is not surprising that the needs of the public would be an articulated
aspect of any regulatory decision.
For example, under the Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA), bank
holding companies (BHCs) that wish to acquire or merge with a bank or
nonbank or partake in certain nonbanking activities must undergo a public
benefit test.311  The BHCA public benefit test requires affirmative public ben-
efits rather than mere absence of adverse effects.312  Section 1842(c)(2)
requires the Federal Reserve Board to consider “the convenience and needs
of the community” affected by the merger or acquisition of a bank by a bank
holding company.313  The Federal Reserve’s Regulation Y also includes a
310 See infra Part IV.
311 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(2) (2012); id. § 1843(j)(2)(A).  In order to pass the public ben-
efits test under the Bank Holding Company Act, a bank holding company, in its applica-
tion process, must prove more than simply that no adverse effects would arise; it must
prove some reasonable expectation of public benefits.  However, if the Board finds some
adverse effects then it is required to find more than speculative or scant public benefits.
Money Station, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 81 F.3d 1128, 1133–34
(D.C. Cir. 1996).
312 Roger E. Alcaly, Neither Convenient Nor Needed: The Convenience and Needs and Public
Benefits Tests of the Bank Holding Company Act, 96 BANKING L.J. 325, 328–29 (1979).
313 § 1842(c)(2).  Section 1843(j)(2)(A) lays out a cost-benefit analysis of nonbanking
activity or acquisition for regulators to consider such as increased convenience, competi-
tion, and efficiency that must outweigh adverse effects such as concentration of resources,
unfair competition, conflicts of interest, or unsound banking practices. § 1843(j)(2)(A).
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public benefit test for approving mergers or new activities by banks.314  The
test asks, for example, whether the merger or proposed activity will lessen
competition or whether the change will “meet[ ] the convenience and needs
of the community.”315  The National Bank Act also requires the OCC to ana-
lyze public benefits, such as community development, philanthropy, and the
needs of the community, when national banks are formed or acquire or
merge with other national or interstate banks.316  The Riegle-Neal Act’s pub-
lic benefit test requires interstate bank merger applicants to prove that the
merger will not violate concentration limits and that the applicant is in com-
pliance with the CRA.317
Despite the public benefit test’s salience, in practice no searching
inquiry into the actual needs of the public is undertaken.  In fact, the factors
that are used to determine “public benefit” are those that often benefit the
banks themselves.  The Federal Reserve Board and the OCC have broad dis-
cretion in applying these factors on a case-by-case basis.318  The OCC has
stated that it gauges “public benefit” using a cost-benefit analysis of decreas-
ing competition, the needs of the community, and performance of the Com-
munity Reinvestment Act.319  Bank regulators often interpret these public
benefit tests as either advancing efficiency or increased competition.320  For
314 12 C.F.R. § 225.26 (2013).  Regulation Y lists public benefit factors the Board must
consider when approving nonbanking proposals, such as “greater convenience, increased
competition, and gains in efficiency.” Id.
315 § 225.13(a)(2).  Moreover, the Board must consider whether the acquisition will
meet the convenience and needs of the community, including its Community Reinvest-
ment Act record performance, affected by the acquisition.  § 225.13(b)(3).
316 12 U.S.C. § 43(a) (2012).
317 § 1831u(b)(2)–(3).
318 Nat’l Courier Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 516 F.2d 1229,
1233, 1237 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
319 See Decision of the OCC on the Applications of Bank of America, Corporate Deci-
sion #97-52, 8–9 (June 25, 1997), available at http://www.occ.gov/static/interpretations-
and-precedents/jul97/cd97-52.pdf; Decision of the OCC on the Applications of Bank One,
Corporate Decision #97-33, 4–6 (June 1, 1997), available at http://www.occ.gov/static/
interpretations-and-precedents/jun97/cd97-33.pdf.
320 See Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 658
F.2d 571, 574–75 (8th Cir. 1981) (“[T]he Board must carefully consider many factors
under the public benefits test including, but not limited to, the precise manner in which
the ‘de novo’ entry is to be affected, the dangers of undue concentration of resources,
decreased or unfair competition, conflicts of interest and unsound banking practices.”);
Alcaly, supra note 313, at 328 (discussing convenience, competition, and efficiency as pub-
lic benefits to be considered).  A federal study revealed that the Board consistently cited six
types of public benefits:
(1) improvements relating to convenience and needs of the community to be
served, (2) increased competition, (3) improved operational efficiency, (4)
expanded financial resources for the firm to be acquired and/or the holding
company, (5) improved management for the acquired firm, and (6) other bene-
fits unique to the particular case.
Michael A. Jessee & Steven A. Seelig, An Analysis of the Public Benefits Test of the Bank Holding
Company Act, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y., MONTHLY REVIEW, JUNE 1974, at 151.
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example, Regulation Y, which mirrors the BHC, explains that the Board must
determine “whether the notificant’s performance of the activities can reason-
ably be expected to produce benefits to the public (such as greater conve-
nience, increased competition, and gains in efficiency) that outweigh
possible adverse effects (such as undue concentration of resources,
decreased or unfair competition, conflicts of interest, and unsound banking
practices).”321  Regulators rarely require much more than a cost-benefit type
analysis of the bank itself to cross the public benefit hurdle.  They rarely
question whether a bank’s engagement in a particular activity actually bene-
fits the public.  Instead, the regulatory focus has been much more on profit-
ability and has been aligned with the corporation’s own interest.322  In other
words, if an activity results in increased profits to the corporation, that alone
is a significant benefit unlikely to be outweighed by negative public effects,
such as decreased competition.323
My own review of hundreds of agency opinions, specifically related to
BHC’s seeking merger approvals, from the 1970s until today, reveals that the
public benefit test has become less searching over time.  In the 1970s, I found
examples of banks being denied merger approvals because the proposed
merger did not meet public needs and convenience.324  The trend was also
that regulators made a searching inquiry into the needs of the community
and provided examples of how a specific merger would enhance the welfare
of the community.325  After the enactment of the CRA in 1977, the focus of
The study further finds that, as of February 1974, only twenty-five orders of denials
were published, and in the vast majority, the primary reason was reduction of existing or
potential competition. Id. at 157–60.
321 12 C.F.R. § 225.26(a) (2013).
322 See Alcaly, supra note 313, at 329, 331 (discussing the “superfluous” public benefits
of convenience and efficiency while noting the correlation between profitability of banks
and their ability to generate public benefits).
323 A 1977–1978 Federal Reserve survey concluded that it was difficult to demonstrate
whether “the public interest standards of the act have fostered the public welfare signifi-
cantly.”  Anthony W. Cyrnak, Convenience and Needs and Public Benefits in the Bank Holding
Company Movement, in THE BANK HOLDING COMPANY MOVEMENT TO 1978, at 263, 286
(1978); see also David R. Allardice, Convenience and Needs Considerations: A Post-Audit Survey
2–8 (Fed. Res. Bank of Chi., Research Paper No. 78-2, Sept. 1978); Joseph E. Rossman, Jr.
& B. Frank King, Convenience and Needs: Holding Company Claims and Actions 1–2 (Fed. Res.
Bank of Atlanta, Research Paper No. 2, May 1978).
324 N. Shore Capital Corp., 58 Fed. Res. Bull. 809, 810 (1972) (denying BHC formation
because public needs and convenience were already being met and because of concerns
about over-leverage and mistreatment of minority shareholders).
325 See W. Mich. Corp., 63 Fed. Res. Bull. 506, 508 (1977) (finding public benefits,
including increased lending capacity, upgraded agricultural loan services, and new savings
programs); Tex. Commerce Bancshares, Inc., 58 Fed. Res. Bull. 984, 986 (1972) (holding
that community benefit came from new services including petroleum financing services
that the community currently lacked and needed); First Ala. Bancshares, Inc., 57 Fed. Res.
Bull. 404, 407, 411 (1971) (approving merger because community needs—such as the fact
that Alabama was one of the least economically developed states—outweighed anticompe-
titive monopoly concerns).
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the public benefit test shifted to ask whether the bank was in compliance with
the CRA, which served as a rubber stamp for meeting the public benefit
test.326  Regulators did consider whether there were serious anti-competitive
concerns, but if those were not present, there was no inquiry as to benefits of
the merger.327  When regulators did evaluate the actual public benefit, often
the benefits were those that accrued to the bank, not the public.328  In one
example, a merger involving the second-largest banking corporation in Min-
nesota was approved by the Federal Reserve, in the face of strong anti-com-
petitive concerns, because of “the significant public benefit of resolving the
capital deficiency of an impaired institution in a private transaction without cost
to the federal deposit insurance funds.”329
In addition to the public benefit test being watered-down by contempo-
rary regulators, it has been completely left out of major banking legislation
during and after the deregulatory era.  The GLB Act was the first major bank-
ing regulation that did away with any public benefit inquiry.  The act was
passed in 1999 after two decades of deregulation.  The act does reinforce the
CRA requirements for public benefit by codifying that nothing in the act
changes these requirements.330  This last concession was a major sticking
point in the legislation and was heavily contested, but written into the act in
order to get it passed.331  The compromise was that the GLB Act required the
Federal Reserve and the Treasury Department to study whether these pro-
grams were generally profitable.332  The Federal Reserve found that the major-
ity (sixty-one percent) were generally profitable for large institutions.333
The Dodd-Frank Act also does not include a “public benefit” test any-
where in its text.334  It is possible that the new rules enacted by the agencies
326 See Nationsbank Corp., 1993 WL 741754 at *7–*8 (F.R.B. Aug. 2, 1993) (approving
the merger application of the fourth-largest commercial bank in the U.S. where the public
benefits test was satisfied through thorough examination of CRA ratings).
327 See Mercantile Bancorporation, Inc., 78 Fed. Res. Bull. 377, 378 (1992) (concluding
that no anticompetitive concerns existed “that are not outweighed by the public benefits in
this case” but identifying none of those benefits); see also Nationsbank, 1993 WL 741754 at
*8 (finding, on a second matter, no anticompetitive concerns, and no discussion of public
benefits).
328 See Citizens Fin. Grp., Inc., 71 Fed. Res. Bull. 473, 475 (1985) (“[Approval] will
provide Applicant greater resources for expansion and greater flexibility for diversification
of business activities . . . . [T]hus[, approval] should allow Applicant to continue to compete
effectively with other large Rhode Island financial organizations.” (emphasis added)).
329 Norwest Corp., 76 Fed. Res. Bull. 873, 875 (1990).
330 12 U.S.C. § 1811 cmt. Construction of 1999 Amendments (2012).
331 GIBSON DUNN & CRUTCHER, LLP, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act P.L. 106–102 Financial
Services Modernization 84 (Wash. Rep. on Fin. Working Summary No. 4, 1999), available at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rfi/casebook/gibson.pdf (“The CRA provisions of the Act
were the most contentious and were the last major provision to be agreed to.”).
332 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338, 1469 (1999).
333 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE PERFORMANCE AND PROFITABILITY
OF CRA-RELATED LENDING 69 (2000), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/communi-
tydev/files/cra_cratext.pdf.
334 12 U.S.C. § 5301 (2012).
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will add a public benefit component to Dodd-Frank.  The act does, however,
implement a new policy consideration under the BHCA cost-benefit analysis.
Regulators must now also consider whether a merger or acquisition will cre-
ate detrimental systemic risk to the financial industry and whether that risk
outweighs any benefit expected from the merger or acquisition.335
In sum, the public benefit test was written into the banking regulator
code during the New Deal era social contract and reinforced by the legisla-
tion that followed it, but has since been diluted or excised from new legisla-
tion.  Just as safety and soundness became synonymous with profitability so
too did the “public benefit test.”  To show a public benefit, a bank need only
prove that the proposed activity increases efficiency and competition, which
do favor the public tangentially, but are not direct benefits.  For example, in
the lead up to the financial crisis, many banks started engaging in highly risky
derivatives trading and bundling of Mortgage Backed Securities (MBSs) into
tranches of Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs).  These transactions,
which were approved by regulators, increased efficiency and competition
among banks; however, if the public need was considered seriously, it would
have become apparent to the regulators that these transactions involved the
now-infamous fraud and unscrupulous lending practices.  These transactions
may have increased profits for banks, but they were not beneficial to the pub-
lic needs of safety and soundness, consumer protection, and access to
credit.336
Although the public benefit inquiry has not been a demanding one, the
charge still exists in banking legislation and provides an explicit mandate to
regulators to use their authority to consider public needs.  Regulators can
and should take up this statutory charge and conduct a searching inquiry
into whether certain changes in banking do actually benefit the public.  The
legislative history of most of these provisions support using them to demand
that banking activities consider the effect on the public.  This statutory
authority should give regulators at least some greater capacity to push for-
ward the public purpose notion that should be a central component of the
social contract.  Banks have duties to the state and the public and if a pro-
335 See id.; Daniel K. Tarullo, Governor, Fed. Reserve Bd., Industrial Organization and
Systemic Risk: An Agenda for Further Research at the Conference on the Regulation of
Systemic Risk (Sept. 15, 2011), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
speech/tarullo20110915a.htm.
336 Although subprime lending did increase access to credit, it was not good credit or
even credit that many were seeking.  Many of these loans were originated to meet the
demands of banks and not necessarily the demands of consumers.  It was clear from the
beginning of the crisis that it was Wall Street, not Main Street, demand that led to the glut
of subprime lending.  Toward the end of the crisis, banks were desperately seeking new
customers to meet the demands of the insatiable CDO markets, which led to some of the
most fraudulent actions by mortgage originators, such as no-doc loans, thin FICO file
loans, and “liar loans.” Enhancing Investor Protection and the Regulation of the Securities Mar-
kets: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 1 (2009)
(statement of Lynn E. Turner), available at  http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/index.
cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=16e2bab5-2d77-4f6e-a471-933a438f6cac.
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posed activity has the potential to harm the public, that activity should be
discouraged.
CONCLUSION
This Article makes the case that given the unique features of banks and
their dependence on their sponsoring government, there is an implicit social
contract between banks and the state.  This social contract is supported by
history as well as the legislative code.  This Article lays out the contours of the
historic social contract and proposes that the social contract of the future
focus on three pillars: safety and soundness, consumer protection, and access
to credit.  Revising the social contract does not entail more, and certainly not
more complex, regulation.  What it does require is an understanding that
banks are not like other corporations due to their relationship with their
sponsoring state and the public safety net that enables their success and con-
tinued existence.  This relationship should inform regulatory philosophy.
Specifically, regulators should not look primarily at profitability when gaug-
ing safety and soundness, they should be concerned with strong protections
of consumers, and they should engage the banking system in increasing
access to credit to all citizens.  Regulators should build on the “public bene-
fit” tests incorporated in much of banking regulation to develop a new regu-
latory paradigm built on a reinvigorated social contract that will ensure banks
meet the needs of the public in the years to come.  Furthermore, they should
ask whether a given bank proposal will increase safety and soundness of the
system, protect consumers, and increase access to credit.  Giving the “public
benefit” test more meaning is just one step toward re-defining the social
contract.
